PePiPoo Helping the motorist get justice Support health workers

Welcome Guest ( Log In | Register )

File of cases to assist arguments, listed under various headings
Hippocrates
post Wed, 7 May 2014 - 23:01
Post #1


Member


Group: Members
Posts: 9,876
Joined: 20 Mar 2012
Member No.: 53,821



I am offering this list of cases to help people find cases quickly in order to support their arguments. It also saves me time in cross-referring to my other browser!

http://www.patasregistersofappeals.org.uk/

Please feel free to add. If you do so, please indicate at the start of your post the type of case your chosen decision(s) e.g. legitimate expectation.

Charge Certificate: premature issue

2130230240 and 2050339777. 213021691A. 213040742A 2140034850 2130622819 2140065151
2130296792, 2140068375.

Evidence not served in time

2110144328, 2130131442, 2120451094, 2130259672.


Will/may cases

2110072817, 2100649871, 2110415753, 2120021652, 2130049862, 2120448511, 212058885A, 2130236316, 2130516990, 2140068320, 2140026692, 2140006797, 2140046893, 2110029250

Legitimate expectation

2120130716, 2120134353 , 2110055104,. 2130190430, 2120088937, 2130288681, 213031735A

Mandatory info missing from Reg. 10 PCN

The PCN does not contain mandatory information re viewing the evidence. Case Nos.: 2120293222, 2130089798, 2130149029, 2130034162, 2130397290, 2130011644, 2130430807, 2140026692, 2140006797, 2140068320. 213009616A, 2120473279

Regulation 3(4) opening statement and 3(5) and (6) in their entirety. The adjudicator in the first case cites the legislation in her decision.

Representations treated as requests

2120488345, 2100587978, 2120408958, 2110494261.

Multiple choice decision: Code 12

2120562288

Failure to consider

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...ly%2520case.pdf

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...0discretion.pdf

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...520decision.pdf

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...520decision.pdf

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...520decision.pdf

Fettered discretion: I am unable to cancel

2130316200, 2130521902, 2130497615.

This post has been edited by Hippocrates: Mon, 12 May 2014 - 20:47


--------------------
There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know.

Donald Rumsfeld

There are known knowns which, had we known, we would never have wished to know. It is known that this also applies to the known unknowns. However, when one attends PATAS, Mr Rumsfeld's idea that there are also unknown unknowns fails to apply because, anyone who is in the know, knows that unknown unknowns are purely a deception otherwise known as an aleatory experience or also known as a lottery. I know that I know this to be a fact and, in this knowledge, I know that I am fully prepared to present my case but, paradoxically, in full knowledge that the unknown unknowns may well apply in view of some adjudicators' lack of knowing what they ought to know.

"Hippocrates"
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
20 Pages V  « < 14 15 16 17 18 > »   
Start new topic
Replies (300 - 319)
Advertisement
post Wed, 7 May 2014 - 23:01
Post #


Advertise here!









Go to the top of the page
 
Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sun, 23 Jun 2019 - 10:51
Post #301


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



NTO has a number of entries showing the correct start of the 28 day period but the one entry that doesn't counts as a procedural impropriety

This is Barnet where they incorrectly state the 28 day period starts with the date of the NTO not its service.

2190177587 (Extract)

Mr Levy complains about the contents of the Notice to Owner. The Notice to Owner does convey to its recipient that he or she can make representations to the Authority. I am satisfied that no reasonable person would interpret this as saying that one would have to pay within 28 days even when one makes representations. Furthermore, the Notice goes on to say that "On receipt of the Notice of Rejection you must either pay the penalty charge....." Why would the Notice say this if it can be inferred that payment was expected irrespective of whether representations are made?

The submission that the Notice must indicate that the Adjudicator may extend the period in which an appeal can be made was successful in previous cases which have been overruled on review.

Lastly. Mr Levy submits that the Notice to Owner is not compliant with the Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) General Regulations 2007" in that it states that if the Penalty charge is not paid before the end of the 28 days period beginning with the date of this Notice".

The Regulations provided that this period, known as the payment period, is the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the notice is served.

The Authority’s response as follows:

“It is considered that when a customer receives a Notice to Owner, that they would read this as a whole and not one sentence in isolation. It should also be noted that, in the previous sentence to that which the Adjudicator has referenced, it is advised that ‘the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which this Notice to Owner was served’ can be found repeated within the remainder of the served notice.”

The Authority has not cited any legal authority to support their proposition. I suspect the Authority had in mind one of my previous decisions. That previous appeal concerns a moving traffic PCN and the issue was whether the description of the 28 day period after which a charge certificate may be issued (in accordance with the relevant legislation) gives a confusing message as to when the payment period starts. The PCN was held to be compliant when read as a whole because there was elsewhere in the PCN a clear and unambiguous reference to when the payment period starts.

In this case, there are three references to the 28 day period. Two of these references are in regard to the period in which representations must be made and the correct wording was used. There is only one reference to the period for payment and the incorrect start date is used. It is not clear to me how the recipients of the notice, most of whom do not have an in depth knowledge of the Regulations, would understand that the period for payment is also period in which representations must be made, and that they both start from the date of service.

The fact that the Appellant not made payment but made representations (on time or otherwise) and the fact that the Authority allows as a matter of practice extra days to pay is irrelevant.

The issue is whether the Notice to Owner conveys at least substantially the information which it is required to convey. If it does not, it is a procedural impropriety. I am satisfied that the Notice to Owner is non-compliant and not even substantially compliant. I allow the appeal.

------------------------------




Mick




Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sun, 4 Aug 2019 - 08:49
Post #302


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Barnet Footway Parking---Failure to provide Resolution.
Parked o/s a marked bay.


2190183921

The Authority's case is that the Appellant's vehicle was parked with one or more wheels on or over a footpath or any part of a road other than a carriageway when in Old Rectory Gardens on 3 February 2019 at 15.26.

The Appellant denies the contravention, and also argues procedural impropriety by the Authority.

I have considered the evidence in this case and I find that this PCN cannot be upheld for the following reasons:

First, part of Old Rectory Gardens has marked bays to indicate where footway parking is permitted.

Second, the Appellant has not denied parking as seen in the CEO's photo shots outside those marked bays.

Third, however, the Appellant's principal point is that the Authority has not produced copies of the resolution that is required under section 15(4) of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1974 (as amended) to authorise the statutory exemption in Old Rectory Gardens.

Fourth, an Appellant is not usually able to discover the existence of such resolution and a request to the Authority is properly made in formal representations.

Fifth, the Authority should be aware that footway parking is prohibited unless the location has been exempted by a council resolution or a form of a TMO specifically for the purpose of exempting certain bays.

Sixth, the Authority never produced the evidence that confirmed that the statutory exemption applied to those parts of Old Rectory Road that had painted marked bays; signage is also required.

Seventh, to put this another way; it is not the signs and lines that create the exemption from the prohibition to park on the footway, it is either a Council resolution or a TMO for that specific purpose.

Eighth, an Authority is not entitled without such resolution to place marked bays in a road to provide parking places for footway parking.

Ninth, the Appellant's point being 'How do I know that the marked bays have been correctly marked ?' and 'How do I know that the location where I was parked was not exempted by the resolution'. These are legitimate questions that the Authority has not responded to as required by the regulations; this is a procedural impropriety.

Accordingly, taking these matters together I find that this PCN is not proved because the Authority has failed in its duty to respond to the representations made by the Appellant, and, secondly has not produced evidence of where the resolution states that footway parking is permitted in Old Rectory Gardens.

The appeal is allowed.

-----------------------




Mick





Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sun, 11 Aug 2019 - 08:26
Post #303


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Waltham Forest--- Bus Lane Contraventions
How wrong can they be?


2190278212
The Authority did not supply a copy of a Traffic Management Order (TMO). It submits that there is no requirement for a TMO. It is therefore reasonable for me to infer that there is no TMO for this bus lane when, contrary to the Authority's submission, there is a legal requirement for a TMO.

The Authority did not provide any evidence of signage.

The Authority provided a statement to say that the recording device was approved under Article 2 of the Civil Enforcement of Parking and Traffic Contraventions (approved Devices)(England) Order 2007. There is no such order. There is a the Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (approved Devices)(England) Order 2007. The addition of the words "and Traffic" would suggest that the Authority is aware that the Order does not quite fit. the Authority would be right. The Order has no relevance. It applies to parking contraventions only.

Bus lane contraventions are pursued under the London Local Authorities Act 1996 (as amended). The Act contains requirements for recording devices, and admissibility of the recorded material.

Bus lane cameras are those cameras which are prescribed under section 20(9) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 or a device of a description specified in regulations made for the purposes of this section by the Secretary of State. There is no evidence that the camera used in this case meet those requirements.

The legislation requires a statement setting out the legitimacy of the use of the camera, and for a copy of the statement to be served on the Appellant not less than 7 days before the hearing. The Appellant can choose whether to issue a notice requiring the attendance of the maker of the statement. The statement was sent to the Appellant on or about, certainly not earlier than, 2 August which was a Friday It is deemed to have been served on 6 August, the Tuesday after the weekend. The service does not meet the 7 day requirement.

The Authority transferred liability from the registered keeper to the Appellant because of a hire agreement. Liability cannot be transferred for bus lane penalties.

For any and all the above reasons, I allow the appeal.-------------
Mick
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sun, 18 Aug 2019 - 07:31
Post #304


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Rotherhithe Tunnel Restrictions

Worth checking the ticket history to ensure they have complied with statutory time scales. They must be overworked raking in the cash!

The diversionary route issue wasn't picked up by the Adjudicator Edward Houghton when he visted the site.



2190287508



The Appellant has pointed out that PCN GT78638979 is in fact dated the 26th May and yet the ticket history shows that it was posted on the 27th May and the information only inputted into the system on the 31st May.

The local authority have not offered any explanation for the discrepancy in light of which I am not satisfied that this PCN was correctly issued .

The Appellant also disputes the contravention stating that the signage was not clearly visible and there were no diversion routes signposted in breach of the local authority's own TMO.

The TMO presented in this case appears to have expired.

Paragraph 3 of LGLA2018 No0451 coming into force on 21st September 2018 states that the order will take effect from "12:01pm on 21st September 2018 until 11:59pm on 30th April 2019 or when the danger have passed , whichever is the sooner " (my emphasis).

Furthermore paragraph 5 of the same order provides "At such times as the prohibitions are in force alternative routes will be indicated by traffic Signs."

The subsequent TMO GLA 2019 no 0047 does not appear to extend the time period or amend or delete the requirement for there to be traffic signs to indicate the alternative routes

The dates of the alleged contraventions are the 23rd and 27th May 2019 which are outside the period covered by the TMO and the local authority themselves accept that there were no alternative routes signposted as they say in their case summary

"It is not a requirement for signs indicating a prohibition to offer a diversionary route" but which contradicts their own TMO

Based on the evidence presented I am not satisfied that a contravention, did occur and allow this appeal.




Mick


Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
PASTMYBEST
post Sun, 18 Aug 2019 - 15:57
Post #305


Member


Group: Members
Posts: 26,655
Joined: 6 Nov 2014
Member No.: 74,048



Havering representations to be made by date of notice

2190290058

One issue raised by the appellant is that the Penalty Charge Notice does not comply with the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003.
Article 1 (3) of Schedule 1 of the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003 states that an enforcing authority may disregard any such representations which are received by them after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the penalty charge notice in question was served.
The Penalty Charge Notice sent to Mr Sheikh states how a representation can be made. The Penalty Charge Notice states that ‘We may disregard any representations received after the period beginning with the date of this Penalty Charge Notice. ‘
I find that the Penalty Charge Notice is inaccurate. The local authority may disregard representations made after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the penalty charge notice in question was served. The local authority is not permitted to disregard representations received after the period beginning with the date of the Penalty Charge Notice. The Penalty Charge Notice inaccurately informs the recipient that unless the representation is made within 28 days of the date of the Penalty Charge Notice it may be disregarded.
I allow this appeal.


--------------------
All advice is given freely. It is given without guarantee and responsibility for its use rests with the user
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Mon, 19 Aug 2019 - 14:25
Post #306


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



PCN not properly "Affixed"

2190288340 (Extract)



Mr. Ogunyemi told me today that when he returned to the vehicle there was no PCN on it. In his representations against the PCN he also said that he did not see the PCN on the date ‘because it was not properly hung in’. I accept Mr. Ogunyemi’s evidence on this point and find that when he returned to the vehicle the PCN was not present. He suggests that it might have been blown away by the wind although of course he cannot know this.

The issue is not whether the PCN was there when Mr. Ogunyemi returned to the vehicle – although that matter is relevant - but whether the PCN was served in accordance with Regulation 9 of the Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) General Regulations 2007. If a PCN is not so served then no Notice to Owner may be served in accordance with Regulation 19 of those Regulations; that is to say, it would be a procedural impropriety to do so. One of the ways in which a PCN may be served in accordance with Regulation 9 is by fixing it to the vehicle. Usually that means sticking it to the windscreen with a form of adhesive or putting it under the windscreen wiper.

The Enforcement Authority (EA)’s case is that a PCN was served by being fixed to the windscreen of the vehicle in question. The EA has provided the electronic notes from the civil enforcement officer (CEO) which contain the abbreviation ‘atw’, which I infer means ‘attached to windscreen’. I accept that it must be the usual practice of CEOs to fix PCNs to windscreens of stationary vehicles. The EA has also provided some photographs showing the appellant’s vehicle in situ at the relevant time. I have looked very closely at the PCN, in relation to the vehicle to which it is said to have been ‘fixed’.

The PCN appears to have been placed between the arm of the windscreen wiper and the wiper itself, so that its corner is under the arm. I find that the PCN was not placed between the wiper and the windscreen. It is evident from the shadow on the windscreen beneath the PCN that it was not placed directly onto the windscreen, where an adhesive might keep it there. Bearing in mind I have found that the PCN was not there when Mr. Ogunyemi returned to the vehicle, and might have blown away, I find on the balance of probabilities that there was not the necessary degree of adhesion or attachment between the PCN and the vehicle to amount to fixing it to the vehicle.

I am satisfied, therefore, that the PCN was not served in accordance with Regulation 9. Accordingly it was not open to the EA to serve a Notice to Owner and it amounted to a procedural impropriety to do so.

I allow the appeal on that basis only.

--------------------------------------------




Mick


Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sun, 1 Sep 2019 - 08:37
Post #307


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Phoenix Way : Hounslow : Consolidated Decision 30/08/19

2190285397

Phoenix Way Consolidated DecisionI am considering a number of appeals and reviews together in respect of Penalty Charge Notices issued for the same contravention at the same location.

At this hearing Mr Thind and Mr Deakis represented the Enforcement Authority but none of the appellants attended in person at this particular hearing, although all had previously made submissions either in person or in their notice of appeal.

Each case will always turn on its own facts but there were a number of common issues raised by Appellants and it is appropriate to explore these in some detail first. Mr Thind and Mr Deakis helpfully addressed these submissions in the one hearing.

I have been referred by parties to various previous appeals before learned colleagues arising out of Penalty Charge Notices at this location. In particular, two appeal decisions of Adjudicator Ms Brennan: Hothi -v- London Borough of Hounslow (2180474156), which was allowed; and, subsequently, Nawaz -v- London Borough of Hounslow (219021383A) which was refused on the basis of fuller evidence. I was also referred three appeal decisions of Adjudicator Mr Stanton-Dunne, Nasreen -v- London Borough of Hounslow (2190100582) which were all allowed; one appeal decision of Adjudicator Mr Walsh, Patel -v- London Borough of Hounslow (2190096099), which was allowed; and one appeal decision of Adjudicator Mr Brownhill, Groves -v- London Borough of Hounslow (2190082764), which was allowed.

All were in respect of contraventions within the last year. It is worth recording at this stage that, obviously, no two appeals are identical and the Adjudicator is only able to decide the appeal before him or her by making findings of fact on the basis of the evidence actually produced by the parties at the time and applying relevant law.

Contravention

The contravention stated on each Penalty Charge Notice is ‘Failing to comply with a prohibition on certain types of vehicle’. The codes and suffixes that may appear on Penalty Charge Notices are to some extent historical from the days when police constables and traffic wardens used a code which could be referenced to a list on an attached sheet, rather than the issuer having to write out the full wording. It is now conveniently used in computerised systems but what the Adjudicator considers is the wording of the alleged contravention, which might colloquially be thought of as the “charge”. Whether a code, or code and suffix, also appear does not affect this.

Location

The location stated on each Penalty Charge Notice is ‘Phoenix Way (Services)’. The Enforcement Authority’s case is that the contravention occurs when the vehicle leaves Phoenix Way and passes a sign indicating a prohibition on all motor vehicles. I will deal with the sign below but issue has been raised as to the status of the road beyond the sign. The Enforcement Authority refer it as ‘Norwood Road’. It has been submitted that this road does not appear on some road atlases or Google Street View and that it is not an adopted road, that is, a road that is maintained at public expense.

It appears that the restriction was originally created by London Borough of Hounslow (Prescribed Routes) (2015, No. 1) (Amendment No. 1) Order 2018 (‘the first 2018 Order’). This was revoked by the London Borough of Hounslow (Prescribed Routes) (No. 2) Order 2018 (‘the second 2018 Order’), which came into operation on 15 December 2019 and consolidated a number of similar Traffic Management Orders. The London Borough of Hounslow (Prescribed Routes) (2018, No. 2) (Amendment No. 3) Order 2019 (‘the 2019 Order’) came into force on 8 July 2019, and thus after the date of the alleged contraventions I am considering. It varied the second 2018 Order and according the statement of reasons, “the intention of the amendment to the existing Phoenix Way restricted access is to make the restriction and the terminology and wording for the authorised vehicular access clearer in the Order”.

It has been submitted that the adjoining road has never been named. The Enforcement Authority have produced a Highways Register map, which Mr Deakis, explains is based on the Ordinance Survey map, showing the location and the continuation of Phoenix Way marked as ‘Norwood Road’.

Whether Norwood Road is adopted or private land, the Enforcement Authority submit that the contravention occurs in Phoenix Way. It is the leaving of Phoenix Way via Norwood Road that is prohibited.

The Enforcement Authority have produced various photographs, plans and annoted images of the signs to show their exact position in relation to the end of Phoenix Way and the start of Norwood Road.

The surfaces of each adjoining road appear to have the same surface but the Enforcement Authority have point out and also annoted some images to highlight a line of cobbles, which they submit marks the exact boundary of each road. The Enforcement Authority also contend that the images clear show that the signs are on the Phoenix Way side, although one Appellant submitted only just and that it depended on the angle at which the image was taken.

In most if not all case summaries the Enforcement Authority state the following or similar:
“The vehicle passes a sign which is placed on Phoenix Way and therefore strictly in contravention at that point, due to the overlay of the two roads the vehicle crosses onto Norwood Road so it is included in the length of road description provided in Schedule 9, Column 2 of the Traffic Management Order. The point of contravention does not occur on Norwood Road, rather continues onto it so the description would not read logically correct if such was listed as the first item in Column 2.”

As has been pointed out by some Appellants, in the Schedule to the first 2018 Order, at the new Item 12, the location is stated to be ‘Phoenix Way, Honslow [sic] … ’. This is obviously a misprint for Hounslow and could be cured under the slip rule as it clearly does not go to a matter of substance. The Enforcement Authority explained that the 2019 Order has rectified this.

I shall refer to the new Order later but am considering the position at the time of the events for which these Penalty Charge Notice was issued.

Exemptions

Exemptions under the original Order were:
- Highways England Traffic Officer Vehicles.
- Highways England operational and maintenance vehicles.
- Drivers whose vehicle registration numbers are on the Authorised Vehicle List.


Currently they are:
- Highways England Traffic Officer Vehicles.
- Highways England operational and maintenance vehicles.
- A Permit holder.


I find that there is no effective relevant difference in these.

The permits are virtual and effectively a white list system is used. It appears that in previous years this route may have been used as a short cut to the M4 westbound motorway service station generally known as ‘Heston Services’. The service station is apparently run by Moto Hospitality Limited and there is also a motel or similar owned by Travelodge Limited on the same site. Some Appellants have submitted that they were staying there and used this route to get to it. Mr Thind added at this stage that Travelodge guests can use this route only if on the authorised list and not every guest authorised and, further, that Travelodge actually advise guests not use it to enter but rather to use the M4. Indeed, the Travelodge website, under that heading ‘How to get to your hotel’ currently states:

“Please be aware that the use of Phoenix Way is strictly prohibited. Guests are strongly advised to use the M4 route when entering and exiting this hotel. From London, exit the M4 between junctions 2 and 3 onto a slip road for Heston Westbound Services. Alternatively, please contact reception who will be happy to direct you.’ Further, there is also a highlighted box stating ‘Important information: Please be aware that the use of Phoenix Way is strictly prohibited. Please see the directions tab for more details. Alternatively, please contact the hotel reception team who will be happy to advise you further.”

The Enforcement Authority explained that a recovery company, Automania Group Ltd, is also permitted but any other recovery service would need specific authorisation through Moto. The site to the side of the junction always appears to have a number of vehicles present but whilst it might have arisen in other appeals, no appellant has submitted that, due to the sharp angle of the turn, they could not see the signs when exiting the site.

Signage

The signs themselves appear to comply with the prescription of Diagram 619 at Item 12 in Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 as indicating motor vehicles prohibited, with an associated plate, permitted under Item 15(1)(d) of Part 3 of Schedule 3, with the legend ‘Except permit holders’. The two posts containing the signs are the same signs on both sides, although each of the cases I am considering relate only to vehicles leaving Phoenix Way and not to any travelling in the opposite direction. The Enforcement Authority indicated at the hearing that they do not currently enforce in respect of vehicles travelling in the other direction. Further, the Enforcement Authority accept that at the time each of the present events occurred, these were the only Diagram 619 signs in Phoenix Way, that is signs back to back on each side of the two posts but nowhere else in Phoenix Way.

There were general information signs on Cranford Way in each direction on the approach to the junction with Phoenix Way. They were certainly erected at some time between March 2018 and June 2019. The Enforcement Authority say that they were there during the period when these present events occurred. The signs advise motorists of the new restriction. However, they are not signs which can be relied upon to prove the contravention.

Evidence produced by the Enforcement Authority shows that by 13 June 2019, new Diagram 619 signs had been erected at the junction of Cranford Way and Phoenix Way with the addition of a plate stating ‘340 yards’. These make clear to motorists first entering Phoenix Way that there is a prohibition ahead which can be, and in fact it, in Phoenix Way. It is accepted by the Enforcement Authority that they were not present at the date of the events I am currently considering.

Article 4 in Part 4 of Schedule 3 to the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 applies to this sign and provides:

(1) Subject to sub-paragraphs (2) to (5), [which do not apply in this case] where the sign is placed on a road subject to a speed limit greater than 20 mph, and is within 50 metres of any lamp which forms part of a system of street-lighting, the illumination requirements for the sign are
(a) where that system of street-lighting is illuminated throughout the hours of darkness, the sign must be illuminated by internal or external lighting for so long as that system is illuminated and may also be reflectorised; or

(b) where that system of street-lighting is not illuminated throughout the hours of darkness

(i) the sign must be illuminated by internal or external lighting for so long as that system is illuminated and must also be reflectorised; or

(ii) the sign must be illuminated throughout the hours of darkness by internal or external lighting and may also be reflectorised.

The signs are not illuminated but Mr Deakis on behalf of the Enforcement Authority confirmed that they were reflectorised. It was also stated that Phoenix Way is subject to a maximum speed limit of 20 miles per hour.

There are other signs at this location. There is a large blue motorway type sign with the legend:

“M4 No Entrance to Motorway Offenders will be Prosecuted”

The Enforcement Authority submitted that it was thought that leaving it in situ would be an extra warning to motorists but accept it may have caused confusion and that it has now been, or will shortly be, removed. It may be arguable that a very large number of signs close together may make it impossible for a motorist to comprehend whilst driving, which is not the case here.

There were some other signs which I understand were removed when the prohibition signs were erected but whish have been submitted in evidence. These are roundels with a bed symbol, a figure ‘10’, a humped surface symbol and a large left pointing arrow. The ‘10’ and the arrow have blue borders and clearly neither are a prescribed road traffic sign. Whilst the arrow might have caused some confusion, I accept that none of these signs were present at the date of any of the contraventions I am considering.

Position of Signs

A Diagram 619 sign is subject to Item 1 in Part 5 of Schedule 3, being the Schedule 3 General Directions. This provides:

(1) The sign must only be placed to indicate the effect of an Act, order, regulation, bylaw, resolution or notice which prohibits or restricts the use of the road by traffic.

(2) When the sign is placed to indicate the point at which a restriction, requirement or prohibition begins or ends, it must be placed as near as practicable to that point.

(3) Sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to—

(a) a sign provided for at item 1 of the Part 2 sign table, when placed on the central island of a roundabout or in combination with a plate displaying the legend “Dual carriageway”; and

(b) a sign provided for at item 2 of the Part 2 sign table (either without an associated plate or with a plate with the legend “Dual carriageway”), when placed on a road approaching its junction with a dual carriageway road.

The Enforcement Authority have produced a number of annotated images to indicate the exact position of the signs.

In one typical case summary I am considering the Enforcement Authority state:

“The contravention does in fact occur on Phoenix Way, due to the placement of the ‘no motor vehicle’ sign being very clearly before the separation between Phoenix Way and Norwood Road which is defined by a cobblestone line and as per the Councils Highway register. The vehicle passes a sign which is placed on Phoenix Way and therefore strictly in contravention at that point, due to the overlay of the two roads the vehicle crosses onto Norwood Road so it is included in the length of road description provided in Schedule 9, Column 2 of the Traffic Management Order.

“The point of contravention does not occur on Norwood Road, rather continues onto it so the description would not read logically correct if such was listed as the first item in Column 2.”

When referencing the above provision, the case summary continues:

“When the description of the Traffic Management Order is taken contextually with the definition including two roads which meet at the point of the junction to which is being restricted, the signs have been placed as near as practicable with one on Phoenix Way and one directly in line to the junction with Norwood Road.

As Phoenix Way is part of the London Borough of Hounslow's publicly adopted highway … it therefore falls within the classification of a “road” under the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003, due to the public having access.”

Conclusion

If the restriction is on Phoenix Way, then that is where a contravention occurs but the position of the signs convey the meaning, or purports to, that motor vehicles are prohibited in Norwood Road. However, the Traffic Management Order does not create such a prohibition and probably could not in any event.

As already mentioned, the Enforcement Authority have indicated that they do not currently enforce in respect of vehicles travelling in the other direction past the identical signs on the reverse and into Phoenix Way. Such vehicles may well be in contravention of the prohibition created by the Traffic Management Order.

As referred to above, Article 3 of the 2019 Order amends the second 2018 Order by

(1) adding a definition of ‘permit holder’ as meaning “any driver whose vehicle is listed on the list of authorised road user vehicle registration numbers held by the London Borough of Hounslow. The vehicle registration numbers being supplied to the London Borough of Hounslow by Moto”; and

(2) adding a new paragraph j) to Article 4: “No person shall cause any motor vehicle to enter or leave any road specified in column 2 of Schedule 10 at the location specified in column 3 unless otherwise stated in column 4 of the said Schedule.”

This latter provision and the placing of Diagram 619 signs at the junction of Cranford Way with Phoenix Way may substantially alter the position now, although that will be for determination in the future.

Considering carefully all the evidence before me I cannot find as a fact that at the date when these present events occurred, there could have been contravention of the prohibition in the Traffic Management Order as it then provided.

Accordingly, each of the present appeals I am considering will be allowed or upheld, as the case may be.






Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sun, 1 Sep 2019 - 08:55
Post #308


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Vehicle Access Crossing ----footway or road?

This was a footway parking contravention.


2190295608 (Extract)



The photographic evidence shows clearly enough the location where the vehicle was parked. The “road” in question, Lansdowne Way, extends to the very clearly defined building line of concrete buildings, leaving a wide footway between the buildings and the carriageway. The vehicle is parked on an extended length of that footway which has been clearly lowered to facilitate vehicular access to the adjoining premises, the large metal gates. However lowering a footway for that purpose does not turn it into a part of the carriageway (as no public vehicular right of passage is thereby created). A dropped footway remains a footway, and vehicles may not park there irrespective of any question of obstruction. Vehicles parked in front of the gates are therefore parked other than on the carriageway of the road, which is, by statute, in the absence of some legal exemption, a contravention throughout London. It is not surprising that a PCN was issued.
---------------
Mick

This post has been edited by Mad Mick V: Sun, 1 Sep 2019 - 08:56
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Mon, 7 Oct 2019 - 15:21
Post #309


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Newham----Non operational parking meters, the TRO indicates the Council has a responsibility to maintain.

2190367414
In broad terms the appellant’s case was that: i) the meters at the location have not been operational for a significant period of time and the Enforcement Authority has a duty to maintain its meters (article 14); ii) the appellant did not have the means to pay by phone; iii) the appellant left a note on his windscreen to explain his quandary; iv) pay by phone charges a levy which is unlawful; v) the Traffic Management Order required the Enforcement Authority to maintain its meters (article 14) and if a meter was not available vehicles are exempt (article 18); vi) the Enforcement Authority’s case has been inconsistent in that they initially stated that the meters had been vandalised but before the tribunal they asserted that cash payments are not accepted at all.

The Enforcement Authority resisted the appeal. They submitted that the pay and display machines in question ‘no longer work’ and all motorists must pay by phone (see paragraph 5 of the case summary).

The civil enforcement officer took photographs of the meter and signage both of which indicate that payment can be made at the meter. The meter itself offers the option to pay by phone and has a facility to pay by cash but this was not operational on the day in question as can be seen from the photographs the civil enforcement officer took at the time.

The starting point is that a motorist must pay to park. The fact that the appellant did not have the means to pay by phone did not absolve him of the obligation to pay. A motorist must pay by one of the means of payment offered. The fact that appellant forgot his phone amounts to mitigation and did not entitle him to park without paying.

However, article 14 provides that the Enforcement Authority must maintain their meters. The TMO before me states that cash payments are still permissible (article 16 (a)). The 2015 order amended the 2010 order but article 14 still imposes an active duty on the Enforcement Authority to maintain its meters (see article 4 of the 2015 order).

The evidence before me is that the Enforcement Authority are not complying with their duty pursuant to article 14 of the 2010 order (see paragraph 5 of the Enforcement Authority’s case summary). The Enforcement Authority have produced no evidence that the TMO has been amended or that the signage at the location has changed to advise motorists that cash payments are no longer accepted.

The appellant raised these points but the Enforcement Authority failed to deal with them. On this basis, on the evidence available in this case, I allow this appeal.




------------------------------




Mick








Barnet's e-mail on their moving traffic PCN is compromised

Decision Date 05 Oct 2019

2190370055 (Extract)
The Appellant, however has emphasised that the email address for the making of representations set out on the Council’s website is in fact incorrect, which accounts for his representations going astray. He as informed of this in a telephone call to the Council, and I find his evidence of that conversation persuasive. The Council does not appear to have dealt with point in its extensive case summary, and if the Appellant was simply wrong on this point one would have expected it to have said so and given some explanation as to the two different e-mail addresses in question. On the evidence I am unable to be satisfied the e-mail address on the PCN was correct. It is self-evidently essential that the address for making representations set out on the PCN is correct, and this means all addresses given. It follows that the PCNs in question in this case were defective and no penalty may lawfully be demanded on the basis of them. These appeals are therefore allowed.
---------
Mick




Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
PASTMYBEST
post Thu, 10 Oct 2019 - 15:19
Post #310


Member


Group: Members
Posts: 26,655
Joined: 6 Nov 2014
Member No.: 74,048



This case looks at PCN and NoR flaws with Havering MTC in some depth

2190374806


--------------------
All advice is given freely. It is given without guarantee and responsibility for its use rests with the user
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
PASTMYBEST
post Sun, 10 Nov 2019 - 20:08
Post #311


Member


Group: Members
Posts: 26,655
Joined: 6 Nov 2014
Member No.: 74,048



QUOTE (PASTMYBEST @ Thu, 10 Oct 2019 - 15:19) *
This case looks at PCN and NoR flaws with Havering MTC in some depth

2190374806


Camrose Ave case found on section 36 sign argument


219043298A


--------------------
All advice is given freely. It is given without guarantee and responsibility for its use rests with the user
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Fri, 14 Feb 2020 - 12:35
Post #312


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Vehicle converted to Campervan-- Rotherhithe Tunnel


We had no luck with this one:-


http://forums.pepipoo.com/index.php?showtopic=127470&view=findpost&p=1480676


However this one, with a Review via TfL, takes a more pragmatic view:-

2190292381
Mr Hodges attended today. He appeals as he argues that his motor vehicle is not a goods vehicle and therefore it is not prohibited from using the Rotherhithe Tunnel.

The Traffic Management Order prohibits goods vehicles with a maximum gross weight exceeding 2 tonnes proceeding either north or south bound in the Rotherhithe Tunnel.

A goods vehicle is defined in the Traffic Management Order as a motor vehicle or trailer constructed or adapted for the use for the carriage or haulage of goods or burden of any description.

Transport for London argues that the appellant’s vehicle is a goods vehicle because its category in the DVLA document is N1 which is the category for all goods vehicles.

Mr Hodges provided a copy of his V5C document. It states that the vehicle is a motor caravan taxed as a light goods vehicle. Mr Hodges purchased the vehicle new having had it fitted and customised to his specifications as a camper van. It has a shower and cooker in the van and beds.

I find that the vehicle is not a goods vehicle. It has not been adapted for the use for the carriage or haulage of goods or burden of any description. It has been adapted to be used by passengers as a camper van.

I allow this appeal.


The Review


This is an application by the Authority for a review of the decision that was sent to the parties in this appeal.

I have considered the Authority's application for a review, I have read the original Adjudicator's decision and the evidence.

I have also considered the decision by Adjudicator Mr E Houghton in the review cases of 2190330072, 2190322096 and 2190285251, and I adopt and agree with his reasoning.

The Adjudicator made the following finding in relation to the Appellant's case:

" A goods vehicle is defined in the Traffic Management Order as a motor vehicle or trailer constructed or adapted for the use for the carriage or haulage of goods or burden of any description. Transport for London argues that the appellant's vehicle is a goods vehicle because its category in the DVLA document is N1 which is the category for all goods vehicles. Mr Hodges provided a copy of his V5C document. It states that the vehicle is a motor caravan taxed as a light goods vehicle. Mr Hodges purchased the vehicle new having had it fitted and customised to his specifications as a camper van. It has a shower and cooker in the van and beds. I find that the vehicle is not a goods vehicle. It has not been adapted for the use for the carriage or haulage of goods or burden of any description. It has been adapted to be used by passengers as a camper van."

I find that the Adjudicator was entitled to reach the decision she did on the basis of the evidence before her and that it discloses no error of law. She has clearly given consideration to the vehicle's VCA category, and has taken into account the physical configuration of the vehicle and what vehicles of this kind are normally used for.

Further, the Adjudicator has given brief but clear reasons why she finds that the Appellant's vehicle is not a goods vehicle.

That the Authority disagrees or is unhappy with the decision, or that it believes another Adjudicator might have reached a different conclusion, does not provide a ground for review.

There is no ground under the Regulations on which that decision may be disturbed.


--------------------


Mick

This post has been edited by Mad Mick V: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 - 14:05
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
PASTMYBEST
post Fri, 21 Feb 2020 - 19:46
Post #313


Member


Group: Members
Posts: 26,655
Joined: 6 Nov 2014
Member No.: 74,048



Interesting interpretation and appellant directed to apply for costs

2200018539

The main point to be considered is whether the 'length of time' that the appellant was stopped is relevant to his appeal.
There is also the point as to consider as to whether the enforcement authority's decision was wholly unreasonable.
The appellant's case is that he missed seeing the sign just as he went past it and then, upon realising his error, he immediately stopped and reversed out of the zone.
The authority's case is that the error made by the appellant constitutes mitigation and the fact that he stopped just as he passed the sign and then immediately reversed out of the zone is of no relevance. It has also stated that: "The appellant ... should be conversant and observant of the signs that pertain to the movement of their vehicle."
I find as fact that: there was no fault on the part of the appellant; the appellant did not see the sign showing the restriction in sufficient time to enable him to stop from entering the zone; he had only just passed the sign when he realised that he was entering the zone; he immediately stopped and immediately reversed out of the zone; the appellant did not at any time willfully shut his eyes to the signage; the appellant did not deliberately choose to ignore the signage
I am satisfied that the 'length of time' that the appellant was stopped is relevant to his appeal. The relevant wording in article 4 of the relevant Traffic Management Order reads, in part, that "No person shall cause any vehicle ...". If an appellant has to 'cause' the contravention, then fault on the part of the appellant is required. The word 'cause' means that knowledge of the unlawfullness of the entry to the zone is required. The knowledge required of the appellant can only either be actual knowledge or constructive knowledge. However, if the knowledge is constructive, then this must be due to the appellant having willfully shut his eyes to the signage or deliberately choosing to ignore the signage.
The appellant has also made the point that advance warning should be made available to motorists. The authority states that there is no requirement for advance warning.

The authority must not only comply with the letter of the relevant regulations, but is also under a duty to act fairly in all of the circumstances.
The authority could consider the need for the installation of signage which is better able to accord with the concept of fairness so that motorists could be better informed of the relevant traffic restriction. It could be possible for signage to operate in such a way as to provide reasonable information concerning what might be required in order to comply with the restrictions of the zone.
I consider that the disputed decision of the authority was wholly unreasonable. I direct that Mr Damian Makowicz, the appellant, should make an application for the costs that he has incurred. I direct that Mr Damian Makowicz should make his application for costs to the Tribunal Clerk within 14 days of the date of this decision.
I am unable to be satisfied that the contravention occurred because I accept the evidence of the appellant.


--------------------
All advice is given freely. It is given without guarantee and responsibility for its use rests with the user
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Mon, 9 Mar 2020 - 09:51
Post #314


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



"Reason to Believe" and the evidence to prove a non-display of ticket contravention.



2190434544 (Extract)

The PCN was issued for the following contravention (from the London Councils list of approved PCN codes):


“Contravention: 06p (parked without clearly displaying a valid pay & display ticket or voucher - pay & display)”

The evidence shows, and I find, that the appellant company’s vehicle was parked in Beauchamp Place at 12.25 on 2 August 2019, which was a Friday.

One minute after issuing the PCN the civil enforcement officer (CEO) took a photograph of a sign, which the EA would no doubt assert was proximate to, and referred to, the place in which the vehicle was parked. No other signage is relied upon by the EA and no evidence of other signage has been provided. The sign states that between 8.30am and 6.30 pm on Monday to Saturday parking must be paid for by phone. A telephone number and location reference are stated on the sign. Just beneath the main panel, details of a ‘pay by phone’ app are provided. No doubt users of that app would be able to pay for parking in that location. The inclusion on the sign by the EA of details relating to the app must mean that payment by that app is acceptable. The sign does not make any reference whatsoever to a requirement to obtain a ‘pay and display’ ticket or voucher, or to a ‘pay and display’ ticket machine. There is no evidence from the CEO that such a machine was proximate to the place in which the vehicle was parked. The only inference from the sign relied upon is that payment for parking in that place must be made by phone or on the app. Certainly that is how it would appear to a motorist.

It has never been asserted by the appellant company that parking had been paid for. The EA says that its researches have identified no record of payment for parking for the vehicle. The EA is wrong, however, to say that the CEO’s notes show that no ‘pay by phone’ session was found for the vehicle. The notes make no reference to any researches done by the CEO. I proceed on the basis that parking had not been paid for by telephone or the app but I am unable to find that the CEO had established that was the case when issuing the PCN.

There is, of course, a contravention in the London Councils list of standard PCN codes ’11 – parked without payment of the parking charge’. That might, if the CEO had indeed identified that parking had not been paid for by phone or app, have been the appropriate contravention to allege. But that is not the contravention that is alleged in this case. The CEO took the decision to issue the PCN for the contravention identified above.

It is right to say that there is no evidence that a parking ticket or voucher was displayed in the vehicle. Although the CEO does not expressly state in the notes that no such ticket or voucher was displayed, it is implicit that that was the CEO’s conclusion, given the type of contravention alleged in the PCN. S/he was entitled to reach that conclusion.

Whether the contravention is proved

On the face of it, it is a necessary element of the contravention alleged that the person in charge of the vehicle was subject to a requirement, when causing or permitting it to wait in the parking place in question, to obtain and display in the vehicle a valid pay and display ticket or voucher. The terms of some enforcement authorities’ traffic management orders (TMOs) deem payment for parking by phone or an app to be equivalent to paying for parking and displaying a voucher. The EA has not provided the TMO applicable to this case and I am not prepared to speculate on its terms. There is, therefore, no basis to conclude that there was a requirement to display a valid pay and display ticket or voucher in a vehicle waiting in this particular parking place. On the contrary, the sign does not inform motorists of any such requirement, but a requirement to purchase parking using the telephone or an app.

The contravention alleged, namely 06p (parked without clearly displaying a valid pay & display ticket or voucher - pay & display) is not proved because the EA has failed to prove that there was a requirement to display such a ticket or voucher. Further, the signage in place at the location is inadequate in that it fails to inform motorists of any such requirement.

Whether the CEO was entitled to issue the PCN in the terms it was issued

The EA’s power to issue and serve PCNs in the manner that occurred in this case is provided by Regulation 9 of the Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) General Regulations 2007, which are regulations made pursuant to the Traffic Management Act 2004. Regulation 9 provided as follows (as far as is relevant):

“9. Where a civil enforcement officer has reason to believe that a penalty charge is payable with respect to a vehicle which is stationary in a civil enforcement area, he may serve a penalty charge notice”

Paragraph 1(b) of the Schedule to those Regulations provides that the PCN must state:

“the grounds on which the civil enforcement officer serving the notice believes that a penalty charge is payable;”

As I have indicated, the CEO was entitled to come to the conclusion that no pay and display ticket or voucher was displayed. Was the CEO entitled, however, to conclude that there was a requirement for vehicles parked in the place in question to display such a valid pay and display ticket? For the reasons stated, both of those matters are elements of the contravention alleged. In terms of Regulation 9, the CEO was only entitled to issue the PCN if s/he had reason to believe that a penalty charge is payable. The grounds upon which the CEO in this case believed the PCN was payable were that no pay and display ticket or voucher was displayed in the vehicle in circumstances in which one was required to be displayed.

Whether a person had reason to believe a thing is a question of fact. How that fact is to be determined has been the subject of argument in the Court of Appeal and High Court, by the decisions of which I am bound. In LA Gear Inc v. Hi-Tec Sports Plc [1992] F.S.R. 121 the Court of Appeal endorsed (see p.138) the trial judge’s interpretation of the concept of ‘reason to believe’ in the context of section 23 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The matter was put by the trial judge, Morritt J, in this way (at p.129 of the report):

“Nevertheless, it seems to me that "reason to believe" must involve the concept of knowledge of facts from which a reasonable man would arrive at the relevant belief. Facts from which a reasonable man might suspect the relevant conclusion cannot be enough.”

The concept has been addressed similarly in the context of s.151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, dealing with insurers’ liability to passengers who are carried in stolen or unlawfully taken vehicles. Mr. Justice Keith held in McMinn v. McMinn [2006] RTR 33 (at [17]) that:

“…What has to be proved is that the injured passenger had the information-or what Mr Adrian Palmer Q.C. for the insurers called "the building blocks"-which would have afforded him good reasons for believing that the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken had he applied his mind to the topic.”

I conclude, therefore, that ‘reason to believe’ in the context of the CEO’s power to issue a PCN under Regulation 9 for any given contravention means that before issuing the PCN for that contravention the CEO must have knowledge of the facts or information that would permit a reasonable CEO to believe that a PCN was payable for that contravention.

The CEO in this case had one of the necessary ‘building blocks’ of information because s/he did not see on display in the vehicle a valid ticket or voucher. That, of course, is insufficient to form the belief that a PCN was payable for the contravention alleged in this case. The PCN is only payable if there is a requirement to display such a ticket or voucher.

There is no evidence that the CEO had knowledge of such a requirement. There was no signage indicating that a pay and display ticket or voucher must be purchased and displayed in a vehicle waiting in the parking place in question. On the contrary, whether s/he saw it before issuing the PCN or not, the sign indicated that the requirement was different. I find, therefore, that the CEO did not have reason to believe that a PCN was payable for the contravention alleged and s/he was therefore not entitled to issue the PCN. To do so amounted to a procedural impropriety and the PCN is therefore quashed on that ground.

In the event that the TMO does require payment to be made by phone or app, I am not satisfied that the CEO did ascertain that payment had not been made by either of those means and so s/he would not have been entitled to issue the PCN on that basis either.

----------------------------------------------




Mick



Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sun, 22 Mar 2020 - 15:33
Post #315


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Contravention of not displaying valid P&D ticket is suspect if the machine is out of order.

This one's Newham but it has wider application; an Edward Houghton Decision.

2190494295

As a person of similar age to the Appellant I have a degree of sympathy with the complexities of making payment by phone at the roadside, particularly if the phone is not of the latest type - although my sympathy in the present case is somewhat reduced by the Council’s evidence that the registration number has been incorrectly registered and used on previous occasions. . Nevertheless if this is the method required to validate parking a motorist must simply cope with it or park the vehicle elsewhere.

In the present case, however, the PCN was issued for the contravention of failing to display a P&D ticket (which is what the Traffic Management Order requires), not for failing to make payment. I accept the Appellant’s evidence (not challenged by the Council) that there were no working P&D machines available; and it seems to me a motorist cannot be required to pay a penalty for failing to display something which the Council has prevented him from displaying. The Appeal is allowed on the basis that the contravention alleged on the PCN did not occur.



Mick

This post has been edited by Mad Mick V: Sun, 22 Mar 2020 - 15:34
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Fri, 1 May 2020 - 10:40
Post #316


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Parking at Country Parks and their definition as public land

This is a LA Ombudsman case relating to Kent County Council.


The Ombudsman’s investigation found that because the car park was on public land, the council should have used a Traffic Regulation Order, under the Traffic Management Act 2004 to issue the charge. Instead the council wrongly thought it could make the charge under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, designed for private land, because the charge was being enforced by a private contractor.

Here's the case:-
https://www.lgo.org.uk/assets/attach/4521/R...169-KENT-CC.pdf

Mick
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
PASTMYBEST
post Fri, 1 May 2020 - 10:50
Post #317


Member


Group: Members
Posts: 26,655
Joined: 6 Nov 2014
Member No.: 74,048



QUOTE (Mad Mick V @ Fri, 1 May 2020 - 11:40) *
Parking at Country Parks and their definition as public land

This is a LA Ombudsman case relating to Kent County Council.


The Ombudsman’s investigation found that because the car park was on public land, the council should have used a Traffic Regulation Order, under the Traffic Management Act 2004 to issue the charge. Instead the council wrongly thought it could make the charge under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, designed for private land, because the charge was being enforced by a private contractor.

Here's the case:-
https://www.lgo.org.uk/assets/attach/4521/R...169-KENT-CC.pdf

Mick


That's interesting Mick, perhaps relevant to the private parking forum also


--------------------
All advice is given freely. It is given without guarantee and responsibility for its use rests with the user
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sun, 10 May 2020 - 13:23
Post #318


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



This is what could happen with an Excess Charge Notice
Ombudsman case re:- Huntingdonshire District Council
The complainant, who I will call Mr B, says the Council wrongly told him he had a right of appeal in the Magistrates’ Court to challenge an Excess Charge Notice. The Council did not make clear that it would be a court prosecution and did not explain the associated costs. Mr B says the Council’s errors resulted in a financial loss of £251 and he would like the Council to pay back this cost. Mr B says the court case was heard in a court 100 miles from where he lives.
Decision
  1. The Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 allows Councils to designate paying parking places on highways and to provide off-street parking places. If you fail to pay the right charge, or comply with the parking rules, it is a criminal offence. The Council can issue an Excess Charge Notice (ECN), if the person does not pay the Council can take the matter to court.
  2. There is no right of appeal to an ECN in law, however the Council chooses to allow an appeal to ensure it has not made an error or there are no mitigating circumstances before it goes to court.
  3. Mr B parked in a car park and failed to display the relevant parking ticket. The Council issued an ECN; Mr B appealed because he had forgotten to display his parking permit. The Council dismissed the appeal as Mr B was responsible to display the proper ticket, and the Council did not feel forgetting to do so was a good reason to waive the charge. Mr B still had time to pay the reduced charge of £40, after which it went up to £60. The letter said, “unless new evidence or information is being provided, there is no further appeal against this excess charge except in the Magistrates Court.” Mr B did not pay.
  4. The Council passed the matter to its legal department who took Mr B to Court for failing to pay the ECN. Mr B pleaded guilty and says he paid costs and fines totalling £251.

Was there fault causing injustice?
  1. Mr B argues the Council is at fault for saying there was a right of appeal in the Magistrates’ Court, and for not giving information about the potential costs.
  2. The Council says the term ‘appeal’ is used to indicate that should Mr B disagree with the parking charge; he could make a request to the Magistrates’ Court to overturn the decision of the Council. This would be done by way of a trial, with Mr B pleading not guilty.
  3. The letter says, “unless new evidence or information is being provided, there is no further appeal against this excess charge except in the Magistrates Court.”
  4. Technically the Council’s letter is correct to say there is no further right of appeal except giving your appeal in court. But I find the wording of the Council’s letter misleads the reader into thinking they can appeal to the Magistrates’ Court. It is not clear the Council will prosecute you. Mr B is right the letter makes no mention of added costs. It is unlikely at this stage the Council would be able to give specific information on added costs, but it could say that it would likely claim back its costs of pursuing to court. Individuals can then make an informed decision on whether to pay at that stage.
  5. After the letter in question the Council’s legal department sent further correspondence to Mr B. The first letter was a ‘letter before action’ which confirmed the Council would commence legal proceedings, but they could be avoided if Mr B paid the £60 fine. I note this letter also did not refer to added costs. Mr B did not pay, nor ask what the legal proceedings would involve. The Council then issued Mr B with a legal pack, which explained it would be applying for costs of £150 as well as the £60 parking fine.
  6. Mr B had the right to plead not guilty and put forward any mitigating factors, the court would then decide whether to award the parking fine and the Council’s costs. Mr B chose to plead guilty and was therefore liable for the costs of the prosecution.
  7. I note that it is not until the Council started legal proceedings that it made Mr B aware there would be added costs. Mr B did not have all the information to make a fully informed decision at an earlier stage as to whether to pay the fine. However, in this case I find on the balance of probabilities it is unlikely to have altered Mr B’s actions. Mr B accepted the contravention, he admitted he did not display the required parking ticket and he pleaded guilty in court. Mr B therefore accepted the fine was due but made no effort to pay it. Mr B had an opportunity to pay a lower fine of £40 but did not pay it. Following the Council’s first letter Mr B did not pay, nor try to seek any appeal to the Magistrates’ Court, nor ask the Council for clarity on the next actions or options available to him. Mr B could have mitigated any injustice he claims by doing any of these things.
  8. The Council acted in accordance with the law in pursuing an ECN. In fact, the Council allows more opportunities than required in law to allow the person an opportunity to pay the fine and avoid going to court.
  9. However, as the Council chooses to allow these extra opportunities, they are part of its service and the Ombudsman can consider whether there is fault in its actions. I find the Council is at fault that its letter was misleading about the individual’s right of appeal, and that it does not provide information about the likelihood of added costs until after it has issued court proceedings.
  10. I do not find the Council’s actions caused Mr B’s claimed injustice of £251 for the parking fine and court costs. The Council was not at fault for pursuing the case to court in accordance with the law. The costs Mr B incurred are because of his parking contravention and were awarded by the court. I cannot comment on a court’s decision.
  11. The Council acknowledges it can learn from this complaint and the wording of the letter can be improved upon. The Council has now amended the wording within the appeal rejection letter. If the Council’s amendment has not included mention of potential added costs, then I suggest it includes this to ensure people can make an informed decision about whether to pay or contest a fine. It is also in the Council’s interests for valid fines to be paid sooner rather than later, instead of having the cost and resource of enforcing them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An innocent abroad!
Mick
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sun, 24 May 2020 - 17:12
Post #319


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Salter's Hill---The Give Way Area.

This is not a precedent but Gerald Styles indicates the priority area is between the two chichane signs and NOT at the turn into the road.

2190557850
When the appellant attended on 3 February I watched with him the cctv clip. I accepted the area over which he was required to yield precedence and give priority was that between the line associated with the priority sign facing him before he travelled under the railway bridge and the point beyond that bridge where the 811A pattern sign was positioned.

After careful scrutiny of the images I accepted the appellant argument that the evidence did not establish the alleged contravention occurred. I accepted that the oncoming vehicle did not have to change its speed before it entered the actual length of road lying between the two stated signs and accordingly I have not been persuaded the appellant failed to comply with the priority required by the sign requiring him to yield precedence to oncoming vehicles.


Mick
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post
Mad Mick V
post Sat, 6 Jun 2020 - 10:01
Post #320


Member


Group: Closed
Posts: 9,710
Joined: 28 Mar 2007
Member No.: 11,355



Parking on a mandatory cycle lane can now be enforced if there are yellow road markings

From 22 June 2020 if a vehicle is stationary in a mandatory cycle lane and there are waiting and/or loading restrictions in place enforcement can take place.


The Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) General (Amendment) Regulations 2020

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/54...gulation/1/made

This should be read in conjuntion with #post 257.

http://forums.pepipoo.com/index.php?showto...t&p=1414166

Mick

This post has been edited by Mad Mick V: Sat, 6 Jun 2020 - 11:02
Go to the top of the page
 
+Quote Post

20 Pages V  « < 14 15 16 17 18 > » 
Reply to this topicStart new topic
1 User(s) are reading this topic (1 Guests and 0 Anonymous Users)
0 Members:

 



Advertisement

Advertise here!

RSS Lo-Fi Version Time is now: Thursday, 28th March 2024 - 21:24
Pepipoo uses cookies. You can find details of the cookies we use here along with links to information on how to manage them.
Please click the button to accept our cookies and hide this message. We’ll also assume that you’re happy to accept them if you continue to use the site.
IPS Driver Error

IPS Driver Error

There appears to be an error with the database.
You can try to refresh the page by clicking here