File of cases to assist arguments, listed under various headings Options

[Hippocrates]

I am offering this list of cases to help people find cases quickly in order to support their arguments. It also saves me time in cross-referring to my other browser!

http://www.patasregistersofappeals.org.uk/

Please feel free to add. If you do so, please indicate at the start of your post the type of case your chosen decision(s) e.g. legitimate expectation.

Charge Certificate: premature issue

2130230240 and 2050339777. 213021691A. 213040742A 2140034850 2130622819 2140065151
2130296792, 2140068375.

Evidence not served in time

2110144328, 2130131442, 2120451094, 2130259672.


Will/may cases

2110072817, 2100649871, 2110415753, 2120021652, 2130049862, 2120448511, 212058885A, 2130236316, 2130516990, 2140068320, 2140026692, 2140006797, 2140046893, 2110029250

Legitimate expectation

2120130716, 2120134353 , 2110055104,. 2130190430, 2120088937, 2130288681, 213031735A

Mandatory info missing from Reg. 10 PCN

The PCN does not contain mandatory information re viewing the evidence. Case Nos.: 2120293222, 2130089798, 2130149029, 2130034162, 2130397290, 2130011644, 2130430807, 2140026692, 2140006797, 2140068320. 213009616A, 2120473279

Regulation 3(4) opening statement and 3(5) and (6) in their entirety. The adjudicator in the first case cites the legislation in her decision.

Representations treated as requests

2120488345, 2100587978, 2120408958, 2110494261.

Multiple choice decision: Code 12

2120562288

Failure to consider

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...ly%2520case.pdf

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...0discretion.pdf

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...520decision.pdf

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...520decision.pdf

http://davidmarq.com/uploaderv6_1/files/7/...520decision.pdf

Fettered discretion: I am unable to cancel

2130316200, 2130521902, 2130497615.

This post has been edited by Hippocrates: Mon, 12 May 2014 - 20:47

[Advertisement]

[cp8759]

Parking on a mandatory cycle lane can now be enforced if there are yellow road markings[b]

Mick what it actually says it that enforcement can now be carried out via CCTV / postal PCN.

[Mad Mick V]

Correct, but there must be a traffic order for the yellow lines and associated signs alongside mandatory cycle lanes otherwise Councils will be in difficulty.


The other case I posted indicated that a cycle lane on its own, even if marked as such, could only attract the offence of driving in a cycle lane. This amendment changes things and I would expect that when cameras are operational being in a cycle lane will be added to the contravention list as a moving traffic violation (probably aimed at motorbikes first up).


Mick

[PASTMYBEST]

This case should serve as a warning. I have recently seen two others where the council have applied for cost when evidence is withheld til adjudication

2200277118

The Council has in its case summary indicated I believe that any agreement to extend the initial lease of a year should not be treated as qualifying for transfer of liability.

The initial lease as submitted had expired by the date of the alleged contravention.

I have viewed the document as signed and witnessed on 28 and 29 January 2020 as a contractual extension of the earlier long-term lease.

In my judgment it suffices for requiring the Council to cancel the notice to owner served on the appellant.

I consider I am obliged to remark that the appellant failure to send in that document as signed on 28 and 29 January 2020 when making representations is highly regrettable as I see it as resulting in a waste of public resource that is to say Council time and expense. If the appellant is unable to manage representations made to councils more efficiently in future it may find itself at risk of having to pay the Council's Tribunal and other costs even where an appeal is eventually successful at the appeal stage.



APPEAL ALLOWED

[Mad Mick V]

New Traffic Management (Covid) Powers For Councils

The Traffic Orders Procedure (Coronavirus) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2020


https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/536/contents/made


EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&a...zL9UF3y1N8qV2-v


Mick



This post has been edited by Mad Mick V: Sun, 25 Oct 2020 - 14:19

[Mad Mick V]

PCN---- Not Containing A Postal Address for Payment
This ground may have been stymied by the following Decision from Anju Kaler (14th December 2020):-


2200475698 (Extract)
I find no merit in the point raised about the Penalty Charge Notice not being valid because it does not state a postal address for payment; section 4(8)(vii) of the London Local Authorities Act 2003 requires the Penalty Charge Notice to state “the address to which payment of the penalty charge must be sent”. That Act was drafted before the days of widespread payment by phone or electronic means. The address required is capable of being an electronic address.


Mick

[Mad Mick V]

Statutory Guidance Traffic Management Act 2004: network management in response to COVID-19
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/...nse-to-covid-19

Mick

[Mad Mick V]

A Newham case on undue delay causing unfairness and being an abuse of process

2210108070
Mr. Simukulwa appeals against this penalty charge notice (PCN) on the basis of a procedural impropriety. The impropriety alleged is that the enforcement authority (EA) has acted unreasonably and indeed unfairly in now seeking to enforce a PCN in respect of a contravention alleged to have occurred as long ago as November 2017.

THE SUBSTANTIVE DEFENCE

Mr. Simukulwa also argued that the contravention did not occur; he says his vehicle had suffered a breakdown and he was therefore unable to move it from the place in question due to circumstances beyond his control. I would not have allowed the appeal on that basis. The evidence of a breakdown was very thin. That, however, illustrates one of the points that Mr. Simukulwa sought to make about the effect of the delay; the witnesses who might have been able to provide evidence or documentation have long since become untraceable and so his case has been prejudiced. I accept that there is some prejudice to that extent.

DELAY

The main phase of delay relied upon by Mr. Simukulwa is that between the issuing of the charge certificate on 29 March 2018 and the service on 16 July 2020 of the County Court order registering the outstanding charge as a debt. This period of delay, somewhat blithely acknowledged in the EA’s case summary at paragraph 3, is extraordinary and entirely unexplained. The EA was entitled to request the charge be registered a mere 14 days after the service of the charge certificate. The delay cannot be explained, other than in small part, by the effects of the pandemic, since it occurred for the most part in 2018 and 2019. There is therefore an inexplicable delay of over two years in the process of enforcement. The EA argues that notwithstanding the delay the PCN remains enforceable and it is entitled to enforce it.

What are the legal consequences of this delay for the enforceability of the PCN that was issued?

WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETY

The parameters of the concept of a ‘procedural impropriety’ within the meaning of the Traffic Management Act 2004 (TMA) and the Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) Representations and Appeals Regulations 2007 (both of which apply to this case) were considered by Mr. Justice Burnett (as he then was) in London Borough of Camden v. The Parking Adjudicator (BFS Group 03568 t/a First for Food Service, Lee Sugden, Aidan Brady intervening) [2011] EWHC 295 (Admin). In that case Burnett J held that a procedural impropriety was confined to the definition in Regulation 4(5) of the 2007 Appeals Regulations. That sub-paragraph confines a procedural impropriety that renders a PCN unenforceable to a failure by the EA to observe a procedural requirement imposed by the TMA or either set of the 2007 Regulations.

In this case, no such procedural impropriety is alleged or, indeed, present. The procedural requirements of the TMA and the Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) General Regulations 2007 have been complied with, since more than 14 days elapsed from the service of the charge certificate to the request to the County Court under Regulation 22 of those Regulations. I also add that there has not been a breach of CPR Part 75 and, in particular r.75.3 which governs EAs’ requests for penalty charges to be registered with the County Court. Neither the two sets of 2007 Regulations nor the CPR impose an upper time limit on such a request to the County Court.

In reality, Mr. Simukulwa’s case is not that there has been a procedural failing within the meaning of Regulation 4(5) but that the decision to continue to enforce the PCN in the circumstances is more generally fundamentally unfair, or a breach of natural justice.

CAN A COLLATERAL CHALLENGE BE UPHELD IN A TMA CASE?

A challenge on broad public law grounds was referred, before the coming into force of the TMA and the two sets of 2007 Regulations, as a ‘collateral challenge’. There was ample authority that a traffic adjudicator could, in certain circumstances, order that a PCN should be cancelled on the grounds of some fundamental unfairness or procedural failing (see R v. Parking Adjudicator Ex parte Bexley LBC [1998] RTR 128 ).

Mr. Simukulwa understandably relied upon the decision of adjudicator Mr. Hickinbottom (as he then was) in Davis v. The Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (PAS Case No. 1970198981). That case, which analysed the effect of delay at various stages of the imposition and enforcement of PCNs under the Road Traffic Act 1991, is undoubtedly a very important authority. Mr. Hickinbottom held that EAs are under a duty to act expeditiously and within a reasonable time in the enforcement of PCNs. Part of the reason for that is that delay can cause prejudice to an appellant’s case. What is a reasonable time and whether there has been a breach of the reasonable time requirement will depend on all the circumstances, including the complexity of the issues and the conduct of the parties.

The facts of Mr. Davis’ case were that the EA did not seek to register the penalty charge with the County Court for 12 months after the purported service of the charge certificate. Mr. Hickinbottom held (at p.49):

“There seems to me to be no good reason for an authority to take any great length of time in deciding to proceed to serve, register and enforce a charge certificate. A vehicle owner is just as entitled to know where he stands with regard to enforcement at this stage, as at any other.”

There was a rather weak explanation for the delay. The PCN in Mr. Davis’ case was nonetheless rendered unenforceable as a result of the delay. Davis is a ‘collateral challenge’ case.

The judgment of Burnett J in London Borough of Camden at [46] makes clear, however, that a ‘collateral challenge’ to a PCN issued pursuant to the TMA and 2007 Appeals Regulations must now be framed within the parameters of those Regulations; there is now no longer a general power to order the cancellation of the PCN on the basis of a collateral challenge as such. The case of Davis is therefore no longer directly applicable to a TMA case. I turn then to consider the grounds of appeal within the parameters of the 2007 Appeals Regulations.

As I have said, there is no procedural impropriety here. The 2007 Appeals Regulations also provide that a traffic adjudicator may make a recommendation to an EA in certain circumstances that a PCN should be cancelled, a possibility considered by Burnett J at [48]. That would not be an appropriate remedy in this case because there would remain a possibility that the EA could decline my recommendation. If that occurred any unfairness would not be cured.

ABUSE OF PROCESS

At [53] of the London Borough of Camden case, Burnett J spoke of a further type of a ‘collateral challenge’ that did not sit comfortably in the category that is now defined as a procedural impropriety in the 2007 Appeals Regulations. It is based on the fact that parking contraventions typically used to be criminal offences. Parliament cannot have intended, in changing the status to that of a civil contravention, to have removed a defence that a motorist might have had before the criminal court. In certain, limited circumstances, it is open to a defendant in a criminal case to have the proceedings stayed on the grounds they are an abuse of the court’s process. The jurisdiction arises in two sets of circumstances (R v. Beckford [1995] R.T.R. 251 at 258) “(a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.” It is collateral challenge of the second type in Beckford that arises for consideration here. Burnet J said; “… conduct on the part of the enforcing authority prior to the alleged contravention which would have made it an abuse to prosecute would be covered by this ground”. Expressed within the parameters of the 2007 Appeals Regulations, conduct that, if proved, would amount to an abuse of the process of a criminal court would mean that the alleged contravention would not be proved.

This type of parking contravention used to be a criminal offence contrary to s.35A(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Its status was changed in London to that of a civil contravention by s.65 of the Road Traffic Act 1991.

I turn then to consider whether the continued enforcement of the PCN in this case would amount to an abuse of process in the criminal court. In R (on the Application of Lloyd) v. Bow Street Magistrates’ Court [2003] EWHC 2294 (Admin) the High Court Divisional Court decided that the right to have a criminal charge determined within a reasonable time extended to the enforcement proceedings in respect of part of the penalty, in that case a confiscation order. The enforcement proceedings were part of the entire criminal proceedings. There was a significant delay in that in case in commencing the enforcement proceedings and Mr. Lloyd applied for them to be stayed. It is of note that the Divisional Court observed at paragraph [22]:

“It is no answer to such an application for the prosecuting authorities to say that they are under no obligation to prosecute a particular person for an alleged crime and that there is no statutory limitation period within which such a prosecution may be brought. The point is that, even though there is no statutory time limit for prosecutions and no obligation to prosecute individual alleged criminals, the law will protect defendants from facing prosecutions after undue delay has occurred.”

The Court also noted (paragraph [26]) that whether there has been a breach of the reasonable time requirement will depend on all the circumstances, including the complexity of the case and the conduct of the parties. In that regard I would observe that there is no evidence of any complexity, or of any conduct by Mr. Simukulwa that would justify the delay of over 2 years from the service of the charge certificate to the service of the order registering the penalty charge as a debt.

The above case was applied in Flaherty v. City of Westminster Magistrates Court & Crown Prosecution Service [2008] EWHC 2589 (Admin). In Flaherty, an unexplained and culpable delay of two years before commencing enforcement proceedings rendered those proceedings an abuse of process. Mr. Flaherty had suffered no prejudice because of the delay but that was held to be immaterial; the bringing of proceedings after such a period of time was oppressive. This is an abuse of process of the second type identified in Beckford. The High Court in Flaherty said, at [21]:

“… it is plain as a matter of principle that enforcement proceedings must be brought within a reasonable time (see paragraph 23 of the judgment of Dyson LJ in Lloyd ). Since part of the purpose of the proceedings is, as I have said, to maintain the integrity of the system for collection of confiscation orders made by the Crown Court, and thus vindicate part of the system of criminal punishment and penalties imposed by the Crown Court, all the more important it is that the Enforcement Agency should pursue that purpose with vigour and within a reasonable period. In the instant case, in my judgment, the period which elapsed between 2004 and 2006 was inexcusable and runs counter to the whole purpose for which such an order was sought. It reveals an insouciant attitude by the Enforcement Agency to that which they were required to pursue, for which no proper explanation has ever been given.”

I conclude therefore that if this matter were prosecuted as it would have been prior to 1991 in a criminal court Mr. Simukulwa would probably have succeeded in an application to stay the proceedings as an abuse of the court’s process. Or, more accurately, if enforcement proceedings for some element of the penalty had been subject to a delay as occurred in this case, they would more likely than not have been stayed. The delay in this case is exceptional and warrants the invocation of the abuse of process doctrine, whether there has been prejudice or not.

CONCLUSION

It is, I find, now fundamentally unfair to enforce the PCN. In those circumstances, and applying the principle identified in [53] of the London Borough of Camden case, I do not find the alleged contravention proved.

This is entirely consistent with the end result had the principle in Davis been applied, if the matter had been a non-TMA case. If I had applied Davis, I would have found that there had been a significant and unexplained breach of the reasonable time requirement, that there was no complexity to the case or fault on the part of Mr. Simukulwa and that the delay had caused a degree of prejudice to him. I would have upheld a collateral challenge.

In any event, the appeal is allowed.







Mick

[Incandescent]

Well found !!

[Mad Mick V]

Lambeth Low Traffic Neighbourhood Scheme (Oval Triangle) Found Illegal by High Court

https://apple.news/AOPRpHyprSUuOwh1DPOhVLg

Looks like the restriction is now in force because the Judge indicated the Oval Triangle LTN is now law. However prior to the Council getting to that stage, penalty charges were improperly imposed.

A quick scan of this LTN suggests the restrictions were placed:-

• Albert Square
• Dorset Road jct with Carroun Road
• Dorset Road jct with Clapham Road
• Richborne Terrace jct with Clapham Road
• Fentiman Road Jct with Palfrey Place
• Claylands Road Jct with Claylands Place

Might be more!!!!

Mick

This post has been edited by Mad Mick V: Fri, 2 Jul 2021 - 14:53

[Schofeldt]

Waltham Forest and Barnet Bus Lane cameras i.e. non prescribed or approved: 2210767543; 2210847074; 2220026347.

Excellent work.

[Kooky Cick]

@Hippocrates

for the benefit of newbies like myself, would you please explain how to view the cases from the case number please? googling hasn't helped me

many thanksfor this comprehensive resource


http://www.patasregistersofappeals.org.uk/. this hyperlink is either broken or hijacked: be careful! ( 9th June 2022 )

This post has been edited by Kooky Cick: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 - 07:51

[Neil B]

@Hippocrates

for the benefit of newbies like myself, would you please explain how to view the cases from the case number please? googling hasn't helped me

many thanksfor this comprehensive resource

https://londontribunals.org.uk/
> Statutory Registers > E&TA search

[Schofeldt]

Further London Bus Lane camera decisions: 2210250967 and, more importantly, 2210860888 as costs were awarded against Lambeth. And they lost a review application before that unusual decision to award costs. Further thanks to cp8759.

https://londontribunals.org.uk/

And, thanks to Mr Mustard: 2160470243.

This post has been edited by Schofeldt: Tue, 2 Aug 2022 - 17:10

[astralite]

Stopped on a restricted bus stop or stand

221062105A
Victoria Road
Kingston upon Thames
24 Nov 2021
Andrew Harman
Appeal allowed
This vehicle on the council's case stopped on a bus stop. On the driver's case she stopped whilst seeking to access a parking bay [visible in the council's images provided at 'H'] beyond the bus stop that was ready to receive her vehicle she having to stop prior to entering the bay because a vehicle in front of her stopped. Notwithstanding that the driver used the bus stop to access the bay I am satisfied on her case that she stopped on it during the course of a driving manoeuvre and not in contravention of the prohibition on doing so and I accordingly allow the appeal.

[astralite]

Event day signage. Parked in a restricted street. Controlled Zone. 2140405442
Richmond Upon Thames

…. even if the hours on the Zone sign were adequate to override the time plate there is … a dearth of evidence to prove that the Appellant must have passed
such a sign …No plan of the Zone showing the location of the signs has been provided nor is there any evidence that all the signs had been correctly set to show
the dates of the event days. (There is also no evidence of the Secretary of State's authorisation for the sign, although I suspect on the basis of other cases that
this has in fact been granted). … I am unable to be satisfied the restriction relied on was adequately drawn to the Appellant's attention.

Event Day signage: Event Zone
2220400330
London Borough of Wandsworth
Garratt Lane
30 Jun 2022
No evidence that signage was present on the route the motorist took into the zone.

London Tribunals ETA Register of Appeals
https://londontribunals.org.uk/

[astralite]

A simple case really but the council get a bollocking


2160383400

Miss Bashir appeared before me today for the personal hearing of her appeal. She gave evidence in the same terms as her earlier representations to the Enforcement Authority and her Notice of Appeal, adding further details to her account.

The Civil Enforcement Officer (CEO) noted all the details of Miss Bashir’s car and recorded that this Penalty Charge Notice (PCN) was issued because the vehicle was said to have been parked for longer than permitted. The CEO recorded what was said to have been on the relevant timeplate, showing that parking was permitted from Monday to Saturday between 8 am and 6.30 pm for a maximum of 2 hours, with no return being permitted within 1 hour. Photographs were taken, one of which showed a timeplate bearing that information.

Miss Bashir’s case is that where she parked the timeplate showed that parking was permitted from Monday to Saturday between 8 am and 6.30 pm, but did not show any limitation on the amount of time vehicles could park within those hours. She produced a photograph of the timeplate, which she said that she took on the day the PCN was issued, which appears to show that the lower part of the legend has been obliterated by spray paint. She explained at the hearing that this had been the case for months, and that consequently she and other car owners in the street routinely parked at this location, and had not been issued with PCNs until now.

The Authority’ position is that the restrictions were clearly signed, and that as the street was one-way, Miss Bashir would have passed at least one timeplate before parking her vehicle.

In light of Miss Bashir’s claims, we looked together at the location on Google Street View (GSV). I accept that her car was parked nearly outside Paddy Power, close to a post bearing a timeplate, which at the time the images were captured (June 2015) showed the full terms of the restrictions. However I am satisfied that it was also the timeplate that Miss Bashir photographed at the time the PCN was issued, and that at that time it was indeed partly obscured, so as not to show any time limit on parking.

What is of considerable concern is that it can be clearly seen from the GSV images that the timeplate photographed by the CEO in support of the issue of this PCN is in fact located on the opposite side of the road. Enforcement Authorities correctly insist in other cases that motorists cannot rely on signs on the opposite side of a street to where they park, but must always look for signs on the same side. I therefore consider it reprehensible for the CEO, and in turn the Authority, to rely on this sign as showing that the restrictions were properly signed.

I have had the advantage over the Authority of hearing from Miss Bashir in person, and found her a convincing and credible witness. In light of the above, I am not satisfied that at the particular location where Miss Bashir parked her car the restrictions relied on by the Authority were properly signed. They may not therefore enforce this penalty charge. I trust that they will also admonish this particular CEO, and make clear to all their CEOs that they should not resort to such devices to prove signing when it is not actually in place.

The appeal is therefore allowed.

Re photographic evidence. Note penultimate paragraphs.

[Schofeldt]

Mr Adjudicator Cooper should have invited Miss Bashir, a lay appellant in person, to apply for costs. Out******geous behaviour from a Council employee. 2160383400

This post has been edited by Schofeldt: Sun, 4 Sep 2022 - 10:50

[MMV Redux]

Updated Secretary of State's Statutory Guidance on Parking :-

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/...ng-restrictions

Mick

[Schofeldt]

This case well illustrates the powers of an adjudicator (from The Chief Adjudicator, indeed) and the balancing act necessary to be performed in the delivery of even-handed justice:

https://bit.ly/3PImseO

[astralite]

Location: Yellow Box Junction - two or more possible locations, and not at location stated

2060381000 Inadequate information on PCN
210056419A
2120507905
2130069145
2140187691

2140111099 No YBJ at location stated on PCN (or on photos)
2140200836

Not sure whether any of the above are already in other posts - but maybe useful together.

Box junction not at location stated on the PCN
2220509635
2220512403
Both of these cases relate to Barking Road / Oak Crescent.