PCN in Ruislip Lido, Vehicle not authorised to park Options

[Pavy]

Hi all

We visited Ruislip Lido (London Borough of Hillingdon) after nearly 1 year to enjoy the weather on a Wednesday evening with our toddler . Only on our return to the car park we realized that the car park is not just free. when checked other cars in the same lane none of them had any parking tickets, so we thought we wouldn't need one. The signs were confusing, it was late to undo anything and no one was around to confirm we left the car park.

A week and half later we received PCN for vehicle parked @ M&B -The Water's Edge- Ruslip, Reservoir Road by remaining at the car park without authorisation.

I am not sure what to do, any ground to challenge?

Appreciate your help.

Thank you!


[Image removed]


This post has been edited by Fredd: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 - 16:56

Reason for edit: Image removed at OP's request

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[Pavy]

John Dull/Bull does not seem to be a M&B director

The following are directors of the Company:

Bob Ivell (Chairman)
Ron Robson* (Deputy Chairman)
Phil Urban (Chief Executive)
Tim Jones (Finance Director)
Stewart Gilliland* (Senior Independent Director)
Keith Browne*
Dave Coplin*
Eddie Irwin*
Josh Levy*
Colin Rutherford*
Imelda Walsh*

We had one contract thrown out as the sig was not one of a director.

Thanks kommando but do u have further reference on that case ?

I checked the following site and yes John is not listed

https://www.mbplc.com/investors/businesscon...boardstructure/

This post has been edited by Pavy: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 - 08:02

[kommando]

Its on the forum somewhere, it was a small claims hearing and the contract was dismissed as the signatory was not an authorised signatory, you do not have to be a director to be authorised but with no job title on the form it suggests they are not, also neither company has its full legal name on the contract which also makes it a nonsense document. I would be insisting on proof of authorisation to sign documents of both signees to be able to sign contracts for the respective companies and raising the lack of full legal names as making it void.

https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/authorised-signatory

This post has been edited by kommando: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 - 09:04

[ostell]

Or this is a "contract" that has been knocked up by the back office so that it looks good.

[kommando]

I wasn't going to say but it has all the hallmarks of a made up contract, especially as previous pages off the BPA have the full legal name for ECP.

[Pavy]

I wasn't going to say but it has all the hallmarks of a made up contract, especially as previous pages off the BPA have the full legal name for ECP.

Really how do they hope such contracts which, on the face of it, appears illegal may still be enforceable?

[ViroBono]

I wasn't going to say but it has all the hallmarks of a made up contract, especially as previous pages off the BPA have the full legal name for ECP.

The numbers are written in a style that suggests a non-UK education. John Bull indeed!

[Pavy]

I need some support in identifying POFA 2012 non-complaint .. otherwise I have drafted below response, would like to hear feedback before I send this today as its 7th day from the day operator submitted evidence.

Dear Sirs

I write in response to the POPLA appeal from ECP.

While I raised number of grounds for appeal, ECP have focused on following proving to be deceitful
I question the operator’s authority from the landowner, to enforce any parking charges at this car park. Section 7.1 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice informs parking operators that “if you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the landowner (or their appointed agent). The written confirmation must be given before you can start operating on the land in question and give you authority to carry out all aspects of car park management for the site you are responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges”.
The operator has provided POPLA with a copy of a redacted contract, signed and dated by non-director with no job title assigning rights to charge and enforce in the courts in their own right. I say that any contract is not compliant with the requirements set out in the BPA Code of Practice and does not allow them to charge and issue proceedings for this sum for this alleged contravention in this car park. In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the BPA Code of Practice, a non-landowner private parking company must have a specifically-worded contract with the landowner – not merely an ‘agreement’ with a non-landholder managing agent – otherwise there is no land authority.
Without authority to operate on the land, a parking company doing so is committing fraud, breaching the BPA and IPC Code of Practice, and has no right to Keeper Details or to seek to invoke Keeper Liability. Indeed, without authority to operate, the company cannot even pursue the driver for a Parking Charge.
Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:
7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.
7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:
a) the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined
b) Any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation
c) Any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement
d) Who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs
e) The definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.''

Further my appeal the question on accuracy of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology and what that data is used for is unanswered. section 21.1 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice that states motorists must be ‘informed that this technology is in use and what the Operator will use the data captured by ANPR cameras for’. Further, within Section 21.1 of the BPA Code of Practice, it is stated: “You may use ANPR camera technology to manage, control and enforce parking in private car parks, as long as you do this in a reasonable, consistent and transparent
manner. Your signs at the car park must tell drivers that you are using this technology and what you will use the data captured by ANPR cameras for.”

Additionally, Section 18.3 of the BPA Code of Practice states that any “Signs must be conspicuous and legible, and written in intelligible language, so that they are easy to see, read and understand”.

Within its response, the operator has provided evidence of the signage at the location. while it advises that the “car park monitored by ANPR systems”, it does not inform the motorist what it is using “the data captured by ANPR cameras for”, as required under Section 21.1 of the BPA Code of Practice. Therefore, the operator has failed to meet the minimum standards set out within Sections 21.1 and 18.3 of the BPA Code of Practice.

The signage in the car park were confusing, and terms and conditions cannot be read from ground level. This is the first time I parked after the free parking is made paid. The signage is not only illegible from the ground, but at the entrance signage puts the free parking sign above the Hillingdon council sign and the arrows go the other way.
Section 18.3 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice states: “Signs must be conspicuous and legible, and written in intelligible language, so that they are easy to see, read and understand” but the T's & C's are placed so high up on poles it is impossible to agree to them let alone read them. There are no signs that can be read from the car for disabled people as clearly stated in the code of conduct. Clause 18.9 and 28.8 - So that disabled motorists can decide whether they want to use the site, there must be at least one sign containing the terms and conditions for parking that can be viewed without needing to leave the vehicle. Ideally this sign must be close to any parking bays set aside for disabled motorists.
ECP have been deceitful in their evidence not including any photos of actual site and suggesting the signs are big and easy to read when they are deliberately positioned high up on poles to make them difficult to read and T's & C's were tiny letters to advise the hours and tariff apply to vehicles and payment method
I hope that the POPLA assessor upholds my appeal based on the serious and misleading evidence provided by this private parking operator and provide consistent judgement applied to this previously.

[kommando]

The operator has provided POPLA with a copy of a redacted contract, signed and dated by non-director with no job title assigning rights to charge and enforce in the courts in their own right.

The operator has provided POPLA with a copy of a redacted contract, signed and dated by non-directors with no job titles to confirm an authorised signatory has signed, in addition the full legal company name is not used in the redacted contract including below the signatures making the contract unenforceable as this contract cannot apply to the companies involved without the full legal names being used.

[cabbyman]

You may need to a) edit your response severely to fit it to the reply portal and b) get it online tonight. I note that you posted their evidence last Friday. You only get 7 days to rebut their evidence.

[Pavy]

Thanks for editing Kommando, I think I missed the window @ cabbyman, now do we option to send them email info@popla.co.uk ? 7 days is too short

Has anyone got anything to advice if PCN was POFA non-complaint?

[Churchmouse]

Its on the forum somewhere, it was a small claims hearing and the contract was dismissed as the signatory was not an authorised signatory, you do not have to be a director to be authorised but with no job title on the form it suggests they are not, also neither company has its full legal name on the contract which also makes it a nonsense document. I would be insisting on proof of authorisation to sign documents of both signees to be able to sign contracts for the respective companies and raising the lack of full legal names as making it void.

https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/authorised-signatory

If you're talking about the case I think you are, I believe the DJ dismissed the case because the contract had not been signed by "two directors", based on her rather embarrassing misunderstanding of the Companies Act 2006. UK companies may be bound to contracts in various ways, one of which is by their agents, acting with apparent authority, signing contracts on the company's behalf. In fact, the only way a company can avoid being bound to a simple contract executed by an agent who apparently had the authority to do so is if the party seeking to hold the company to the contract had no honest or rational belief that the agent had actual authority to bind the company. That's a very high bar. An example would be if you happened to find Mark Zuckerberg blind drunk behind a Tesco's and had him sign a contract handing control of Facebook to you in exchange for £1.

Note that the context in which this issue usually comes up is that a company seeks to AVOID a contract signed by its agent. Their argument is invariably that the agent lacked the authority to bind the company, etc. What never happens is that a third party wades in and declares that somebody else's contract is "invalid" because of some alleged (and mistaken) belief that the contract failed to comply with a formality specified in law. This "never" happens because actual authority is a question of fact, and if the company is not trying to avoid the contract, there is nothing whatsoever stopping the company from testifying that the person who signed the contract had actual authority at the time the contract was signed.

If you want to waste time, ink and paper, go ahead and ask Mitchells & Butlers to verify that "John Bull" was authorised to sign that contract. Anyone who regularly sees contracts executed by businesses would know that the lack of job title does not "suggest" a lack of authority--and it certainly isn't conclusive. If you do this without any legitimate reason to suspect that the contract was not authorised, do not expect a judge (or Mitchells & Butler) to be amused.

Finally, what makes you think that contracts that fail to use full legal names are unenforceable? There are good reasons for doing so, but where is this legal requirement that magically makes such contracts "void"? Because that would be fantastic for every single person alleged to have entered into an enforceable contract of parking--not only did they not sign anything, they certainly didn't provide their full legal names!

--Churchmouse

While I raised number of grounds for appeal, ECP have focused on following proving to be deceitful

Huh?

I question the operator’s authority from the landowner, to enforce any parking charges at this car park. Section 7.1 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice informs parking operators that “if you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the landowner (or their appointed agent). The written confirmation must be given before you can start operating on the land in question and give you authority to carry out all aspects of car park management for the site you are responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges”.
The operator has provided POPLA with a copy of a redacted contract, signed and dated by non-director with no job title assigning rights to charge and enforce in the courts in their own right. I say that any contract is not compliant with the requirements set out in the BPA Code of Practice and does not allow them to charge and issue proceedings for this sum for this alleged contravention in this car park. In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the BPA Code of Practice, a non-landowner private parking company must have a specifically-worded contract with the landowner – not merely an ‘agreement’ with a non-landholder managing agent – otherwise there is no land authority.

As mentioned above, the fact that the Mitchells & Butlers signatory was not a director is irrelevant, and the lack of job title is also irrelevant. You would have to somehow procure evidence that the contract had not been authorised by Mitchells & Butlers; do you have any rational reason to believe that Mitchells & Butlers would disavow it? Otherwise, it will certainly be considered binding on the company.

Moreover, the contract can be with the managing agent--that's exactly what Section 7.1 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice says! The managing agent is the "appointed agent" of the landowner, is it not?

--Churchmouse

[Eljayjay]

The case to which Churchmouse referred involved me.

The Judge did say that the way in which the parking contract had been signed did not comply with the requirements of the Companies Act 2006. I think our ordinary experience of life suggests that Churchmouse is right about the Judge being wrong on this point; however, having read the relevant section of the Act, I am not surprised that the Judge believed she was right.

It was, however, the fact that someone called Andrew Copley signed the contract purporting himself to be a director of the freeholder, Premier Ground Rents No.4 Limited, when he was not and never had been a director of that company, which really persuaded the Judge that the parking contract was invalid. Andrew Copley even gave a false address for the freeholding company.

The parking operator's barrister tried to convince the Judge that Andrew Copley's firm were managing agents acting on behalf of the freeholder, that Andrew Copley had made an innocent mistake and that Andrew Copley meant to sign the form for and on behalf of the freeholder. I pointed out that the parking operator had not provided a shred of evidence to support what the barrister said. I also pointed out that the leases - this was a residential parking case - stated that the managing agents had to be appointed by the management company, not the freeholder.

The Judge was not fooled and dismissed the claim.

As it turned out, a little over a month later, Andrew Copley's firm, Chaneys Chartered Surveyors, was informed that it was to be sacked from its role at the development. The firm's dishonesty over the parking scheme was just one of a number of reasons for it being sacked.

It does seem that, especially when it comes to residential parking cases, there are plenty of rogues out there who are willing to sign parking contracts with the parking operators. Unfortunately, the accredited trade associations appear to be ready, willing and able to accept the signature of any Tom, Dick or Harry on the contracts.

That being so, I believe it is reasonable to request a parking operator to provide evidence that its parking contract has been countersigned by someone who has the authority which they purport to have.

[Churchmouse]

I hadn't realised that was your case. It sounds like the PPC was as confused as the judge...

As for the underlying PPC contract in general, whilst it is certainly true that an underlying contract with the landowner is necessary for the PPC to operate on the land of another, surely it is going to be a very rare case in which the landowner refuses to confirm the contract (and thus the PPC's authority)? If the circumstances suggest that there may be an issue with the chain of authority, the judge should seek evidence regarding that authority, not attempt to resolve the case without it and in reliance on bad legal reasoning. I don't know UK court procedures, so I don't know exactly what the options were in your case, but I imagine that the relevant question in general is how do you challenge the validity of a contract if the party you want to challenge is not a party to the case? Because that is the only party that can testify as to the authority of that party's signatory. I suppose it was not possible/convenient to request the landowner or its agent to testify?

In conclusion, even if it is reasonable to attempt to confirm the validity of the underlying contract, how can the PPC prove anything about the other signatory? The PPC is almost certainly legally entitled to treat the contract as binding on the other party (unless it had no "honest or rational belief" that the signatory lacked the authority to do so at the time of signing--which somebody would have to prove), so what sort of evidence could the PPC provide?

--Churchmouse

[Eljayjay]

Churchmouse

We should apologise to Pavy for using this thread in this way but...

In residential cases, my personal experience (which involves a leasehold flat belonging to my kids) is that the freeholder simply regards its freehold interest as an investment, nothing more and nothing less. There is a management company owned by the leaseholders responsible for most of the day-to-day management activities.

I had managed to obtain (and included in my bundle) an email from the freeholder firmly denying that Andrew Copley had been authorised to sign any agreement as a director of the freeholding company. Unfortunately, when I asked for that email, I did not think it would be necessary to go further by asking the freeholder to deny authorising Andrew Copley or his firm, Chaneys Chartered Surveyors, to do anything whatsoever. That omission gave an opportunity for the cock and bull story about Andrew Copley’s innocent mistake to be spun by the barrister.

As it turned out, Chaneys Chartered Surveyors brought about its own downfall at the development. The case was heard on 17 November 2017. About six weeks earlier, Chaneys had issued some service charge demands very nearly 50% higher than earlier demands. When some of the leaseholders started asking some searching questions, a picture of serious corporate abuse gradually began to emerge. Sadly, at the time of the hearing, several bits of the picture were still missing.

Perversely, the good news was that Chaneys’ spin-off secretarial arm had allowed the management company to run out of directors. When that became clear, the members of the management company exercised their right to call a general meeting, which was held on 3 December 2017, to appoint some new directors. Chaneys were invited to a meeting with the new directors on 18 December 2017. By then, it had become very clear that Chaneys had been running the development as though it was their personal fiefdom since 2015. They had not sought anyone’s authorisation for anything they did. This included everything from issuing service charge demands to introducing the parking scheme.

The freeholder regards its investment in the development as just that, an investment. The freeholder really has no interest in what happens there, preferring to leave things to the management company. I have no issue with that. I do, however, believe that, in residential cases, there are many freeholders who have the same attitude. This unwillingness to be involved in day-to-day matters results in freeholders referring leaseholders with queries to the management company (if any) or the managing agents. This, in turn, leaves a vacuum which is, I strongly suspect, filled by rogue managing agents and parking operators entering into contracts without approval from anyone.

[Churchmouse]

Yes, apologies, but I think our discussion is useful to get to the bottom of this issue. And thank you for the additional background, however, yours was a very unusual case (hopefully), with the signatory apparently signing "mistakenly" under a title he did not hold. Obviously, this scenario does raise significant questions, which could include the right of the particular PPC to operate on the land at all. I suppose that a big part of the reason why the judge recklessly seized upon s.44 was her unwillingness to adjourn the hearing whilst the factual question of authority you had reasonably raised could be resolved.

But in the more common scenario the signatory to an agreement simply signs under his own title or, sometimes, no title at all. In that type of case (which the present case appears to be), I come back to the problem I mentioned above: in a UK small claims court case, how can a Defendant force a "parking operator to provide evidence that its parking contract has been countersigned by someone who has the authority which they purport to have"? Once the mistaken belief that a contract is only valid when signed by two directors is gone, there is no way to challenge the underlying contract without having some sort of evidence that it is invalid (e.g., an email stating that the signatory is not who he says he is/is not authorised). That suggests that the correct avenue of approach would be to do what you did: contact the PPC's counterparty and request confirmation/denial than the contract with the PPC was valid. Ninety-nine percent of the time, however, I expect that they would confirm--or ignore--so the utility of doing this will be minimal.

Going back to the OP's POPLA response (which I imagine has either been sent by now or forgotten about!), the part about the BPA Code of Practice requiring the production of the PPC's contract and its full compliance with the CoP is fine:

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:
7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.
7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:
a) the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined
b) Any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation
c) Any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement
d) Who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs
e) The definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

But this was already mentioned in the OP's original POPLA appeal, so the appropriate response here should be limited to checking that the contract provided by the PPC includes each of the requirements stated in 7.3--and if any are missing this should be pointed out.

The part that is not useful is:

The operator has provided POPLA with a copy of a redacted contract, signed and dated by non-director with no job title assigning rights to charge and enforce in the courts in their own right. I say that any contract is not compliant with the requirements set out in the BPA Code of Practice and does not allow them to charge and issue proceedings for this sum for this alleged contravention in this car park. In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the BPA Code of Practice, a non-landowner private parking company must have a specifically-worded contract with the landowner – not merely an ‘agreement’ with a non-landholder managing agent – otherwise there is no land authority.
Without authority to operate on the land, a parking company doing so is committing fraud, breaching the BPA and IPC Code of Practice, and has no right to Keeper Details or to seek to invoke Keeper Liability. Indeed, without authority to operate, the company cannot even pursue the driver for a Parking Charge.

The "non-director" allegation is a red herring--the signatory need not be a director, nor is the lack of job title conclusive. It follows that the "I say" statement is irrelevant, because this does not violate the CoP and there is no reason to believe the signatory actually lacked the necessary authority. In addition, the CoP actually says the authorisation to operate can be from the landowner's "appointed agent", so the statement that the landowner itself must sign is just nonsense. The bit about the consequences of the PPC not having authority to operate is true, but irrelevant when it depends on a mere allegation not supported by any evidence.

--Churchmouse

[Pavy]

Yes Churchmouse it is indeed useful discussion, however it is a lot to take.
I haven't got a chance to send response to POPLA on time (by last Friday) so now wondering should I rebut at all? The requirement stated in 7.2 was my argument and if it lacked evidence, not sure how to obtain it unless I send to POPLA for operators notice.

Now only defense is confusing signage given that POPLA has to apply consistent judgement.

Any chance on POFA non-compliance, to support my case?

[nosferatu1001]

Well given they wont accept a rebuttal now, you are deemed to have accepted anything the PPC has stated as fact.

POP_LA HAS to apply consistnet judgement? What on earth gave you that idea?

Just leave it for now. Youre in the bed youve (not) made.

[Pavy]

POPLA Appeal :Decision Unsuccessful

Assessor NameAlexandra Roby
Assessor summary of operator case
The operator’s case is that the appellant’s vehicle was not authorised to park.

Assessor summary of your case
The appellant’s case is that there is no keeper liability. He states that the operator has not complied with Section 20.5a of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice. The appellant states that there is no evidence of the period parked. The appellant states that the signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself. The appellant has made reference to the Supreme Court Case ParkingEye v Beavis. The appellant has provided photographs of the signs to support this. The appellant believes that the operator is misusing parking to maximise penalties. The appellant has made reference to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. The appellant states that the Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) is neither reliable nor accurate. The appellant believes that the Signs Fail to Transparently Warn Drivers of what The ANPR Data will be used for.

Assessor supporting rational for decision
When parking on private land, the motorist forms a contract with the operator by remaining on the land for a reasonable period. The signage at the site sets out the terms and conditions of this contract. Therefore upon entry to the car park, it is the duty of the motorist to review and comply with the terms and conditions when deciding to park. The terms and conditions of the site state: “The Waters Edge guests must register their full and correct vehicle registration via the console in the pub. This car park is controlled, failure to comply with the following will result in the issue of a £85 Parking Charge Notice: authorised vehicles only”.

The operator has issued the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) as the appellant’s vehicle was not authorised to park. The appellant has raised a number of grounds of appeal, each of which I will address separately.

The appellant states that there is no evidence of the period parked. Images from the operator’s ANPR system have been provided, which show that the appellant’s vehicle entered the car park at 16:49 and exited at 17:41 on the day in question, staying for a total of 52 minutes. A screenshot of its authorised vehicles list has also been provided, showing that the appellant’s vehicle was not registered to park at the site that day. I am satisfied that this is sufficient evidence to prove that the motorist parked.

The appellant’s case is that there is no keeper liability. In this case, it is not clear who the driver of the vehicle in question is, so I must consider the provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 as the operator has issued the PCN to the keeper of the vehicle. The operator has provided a copy of the notice to keeper sent to the appellant. I have reviewed the notice to keeper against the relevant sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and I am satisfied that it is compliant, and that the operator has successfully transferred liability to the keeper of the vehicle.

The appellant states that the signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself. The appellant has made reference to the Supreme Court Case ParkingEye v Beavis. The appellant has provided photographs of the signs to support this. The appellant believes that the operator is misusing parking to maximise penalties. The appellant has made reference to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. The legality of parking charges has been the subject of a high profile court case, ParkingEye-v-Beavis. Cambridge County Court heard the case initially, handing down a decision in May 2014 that a parking charge of £85 was allowable. It held that the parking charge had the characteristics of a penalty, in the sense in which that expression is conventionally used, but one that was commercially justifiable because it was neither improper in its purpose nor manifestly excessive in its amount. Mr Beavis took the case to the Court of Appeal, which refused the appeal in April 2015, stating that the charge was neither extravagant nor unconscionable. Mr Beavis further appealed to the Supreme Court, which on 4 November 2015, concluded: “…the £85 charge is not a penalty. Both ParkingEye and the landowners had a legitimate interest in charging overstaying motorists, which extended beyond the recovery of any loss. The interest of the landowners was the provision and efficient management of customer parking for the retail outlets. The interest of ParkingEye was in income from the charge, which met the running costs of a legitimate scheme plus a profit margin. Further, the charge was neither extravagant nor unconscionable, having regard to practice around the United Kingdom, and taking into account the use of this particular car park and the clear wording of the notices.”

As such, I must consider whether the signage at this site is sufficient. When doing so, I must first consider the minimum standards set out in Section 18 of the BPA Code of Practice. Within Section 18.1 of the BPA Code of Practice, it states as follows: “You must use signs to make it easy for them to find out what your terms and conditions are.” Furthermore, Section 18.3 of the BPA Code of Practice states: “You must place signs containing the specific parking terms throughout the site, so that drivers are given the chance to read them at the time of parking or leaving their vehicle. Keep a record of where all the signs are. Signs must be conspicuous and legible, and written in intelligible language, so that they are easy to see, read and understand.” As stated, these are the minimum standards that a parking operator must meet when informing motorists of the terms and conditions at a particular site.

In addition to this, I note that within the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA 2012) it discusses the clarity that needs to be provided to make a motorist aware of the parking charge. Specifically, it requires that the driver is given “adequate notice” of the charge. The Act then moved on to define “adequate notice” as follows: (3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) “adequate notice” means notice given by: (a) the display of one or more notices in accordance with any applicable requirements prescribed in regulations under paragraph 12 for, or for purposes including, the purposes of sub-paragraph (2); or (b) where no such requirements apply, the display of one or more notices which: (i) specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and (ii) are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land. Even in circumstances where PoFA 2012 does not apply, I believe this to be a reasonable standard to use when making my own independent assessment of the signage in place at the location. The operator and the appellant have both provided photographic evidence of the signage at the site, along with a site map demonstrating the distribution of the signs throughout the site. Upon review of this, I am satisfied that the signage is sufficient to bring the site’s terms and conditions and the amount of parking charge to the attention of motorists and I consider that the motorist was presented with a reasonable opportunity to review them before deciding whether to park.

Overall, having considered the decision of the Supreme Court, I conclude that the parking charge in this instance is allowable. Although the charge may not be a genuine pre-estimate of loss; the signage at the location is clear, the motorist did not keep to the terms and conditions set out on the signage, and the charge is neither extravagant nor unconscionable. While the charge in this instance was £100; this is in the region of the £85 charge decided on by the Supreme Court. Following this, the appellant believes that the signs fail to transparently warn drivers of what the ANPR data will be used for. Within his own grounds of appeal, the appellant quotes the signage, which states: “We are using cameras to capture images of vehicle number plates and calculate the length of stay between entry and exit at all times including bank holidays”. Therefore, I am satisfied that the signs do advise motorists what the ANPR data will be used for. Regardless, I do not consider that this would have affected the motorist’s ability to comply with the terms and conditions. The appellant states that the ANPR data is neither reliable nor accurate. Independent research from the Home Office and Asset Skills has found that ANPR technology is generally reliable. However, we do receive appeals from motorists who claim there has been an error with the ANPR. When considering such appeals, we look to see if there is any evidence to cast doubt on the ANPR’s accuracy. This can come from either the appellant or be included as part of the parking operator’s evidence pack.

Unless POPLA is presented with sufficient evidence to prove otherwise, we work on the basis that the technology was working at the time of the alleged improper parking. On this occasion, the appellant has not provided POPLA with any evidence. The appellant states that the operator has not complied with Section 20.5a of the BPA Code of Practice. The notice to keeper provides images of the appellant’s vehicle registration entering and exiting the site. I acknowledge that it is not the whole vehicle, however it is sufficient to demonstrate that the contravention occurred. Ultimately, it is a motorist’s responsibility to ensure they adhere to the terms and conditions of a site when parking on it. As the motorist did not register their vehicle to park, they have failed to comply. As such, I conclude that the PCN was issued correctly. Accordingly, I must refuse this appeal.

[moneysavingexper...]

Hi Pavy,

What happened with your case at the end? Did you pay?