Liverpool John Lennon Airport PCN Options

[Funlovingcrimina...]

Hi,

A few days ago, myself and a friend were dropped off at the airport (14th March).

Then on Friday (22nd March), a PCN (issue date 19th March) landed through the letterbox of the RK, courtesy of VCS.

I've been reading plenty of other cases on here (very interesting!), but looking for some further advice.

Firstly, it was completely my fault this has come about. We drove up Speke Hall Avenue, elected to turn right at the roundabout rather than go left towards the airport terminal, in order to avoid the £3 express drop off charge, and was intent on going to the Drop Off 2 area. However, we drove down the road a 100 or so yards, and given my friend broke his ankle last year and still struggles a little walking, I told the driver to pull off to one side at an entrance on the left to a small car park and just drop us there.

I'm loathed to pay the £60/£100 charge for a one minute drop off (the time difference between the photos of when we stopped, and the vehicle being back on the road is 49 seconds) where nobody was obstructed - especially when it's VCS who (having read up on here) I'm now not a fan of!

My initial plan is to write a letter telling them as the registered keeper (just a straight rejection rather than an appeal, which looks like the better approach?), we reject the PCN on the grounds that no contract was entered into as the signage can not be read on the duel carriageway without actually having to stop and read it. Furthermore, the registered keeper is under no obligation name the driver.

Additionally, as the airport land is covered by Liverpool Council by-laws, we will not accept any PCN from an body other than Liverpool City Council.

Does this look like the best route to take? Am I better focusing on the contract issue, or the by-laws? Personally I think may be the by-laws is actually the key matter, but I clearly have little expertise on this.

What are the odds of this ending up in court (I think unlikely to happen with a LJLA case, but having read the thread about Webster1's case, I'm unsure?)? I'm pretty robust and can handle a few threatening letters and happily have an argument with VCS (indeed a part of me secretly would be happy to go to court to kick their backsides). However the RK is not as inclined to do that, and would rather pay up (hence why I'm drafting the letter to send off). I intend to convince the RK otherwise, but at the same time I don't want to tell them there is little chance of going to court if that is not absolutely true.

Thanks in advance.

This post has been edited by Funlovingcriminal: Sun, 24 Mar 2019 - 20:00

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[hexaflexagon]

Assuming what you've received is not a formal Letter before Claim there's nothing further to do now.
You've not ignored them, you've been reasonable set out your quite reasonable position, told them to cancel the PCN and put a stake in the ground.

Like many of us you just wait to see what, if anything, they do.
I'm now well past my 4th anniversary.

[Spudandros]

Front and center of any defence for this case should be a clear statement that you were not the driver. Then mention VCS failed to acquire the right to recover the chargefrom the keeper. They will likely argue that 1) bylaws applies to the old airport (it doesn't), 2)even if they did apply, there is nothing in the bylaws that prevents them operating an additional civil regime in tandem with bylaws. 3) Crutchley judgement that signage was sufficient to form a contractual agreement to pass.
Not being the driver is your strongest hand.

[Sheffield Dave]

If they claim that the bylaws only cover the old airport site, you might ask them how Peel Holdings are apparently managing to run a modern airport with no regulations applying airside - since bylaws are for managing many aspects of an airport, not just outside parking. If the bylaws apply to the new site (and its been conformed that they haven't been replaced or rescinded), then POFA says that keeper liability doesn't apply, whether or not the airport choose to enforce the parking rules found in the bylaws.

[Funlovingcrimina...]

Quick update;

The 'Demand for Payment' letter arrived today, insisting that £160 is paid by 06/06/2019.

All very threatening, good luck to them with that approach - won't work in this instance!

[Funlovingcrimina...]

Sit tight and ignore the chain of letters from debt collectors, (including the one disguised as Gladstones Solicitors but which tells you to pay DRP), until you get a real letter headed "Letter Before Claim" (or if you somehow miss that, a letter from court labelled "claim form"), then come back here.promptly for advice.

If you move in the meantime, be sure to tell VCS your new address.

In the meantime you might want to send a Subject Access Request (SAR) to VCS to get all the paperwork they have on you/your vehicle.

Or of course if you want to avoid court, you could pay them now, not that anyone here would recommend that.

Well well well...... in this morning's post a claim form arrived for the RK from the County Court.

This came as somewhat of a surprise as no Letter Before Claim has come through.

That aside, full intention is to defend it. We will complete the paperwork asap, but some advice as to what to write as the defence in box 3 would be appreciated. Clearly there is only a limited amount of space in that box - do we need to raise every point we want to use as the defence, or can this be brief - with the intention that when/if it comes to court we can then raise points we have not raised previously?

[DWMB2]

When acknowledging service you leave the defence entirely blank. You will submit your defence as a PDF. This post HERE on MSE is very useful reading as to what the court process entails and the various stages. There's also a template defence you can use as a starting point, and a guide to acknowledging service etc.

[nosferatu1001]

Could have been lost in the post

Obviously you challenge the two year delay in bringing a claim, and thr interest they've added, and no doubt the made up debt recovery costs never incurred and in any case must be accounted for as part of the parking charge initial amount, so sayeth the appeals court and Supreme Court.

You are NEVER EVER EVER writing ANYTHING using a paper form. Don't do it

Mcol
Sign up
Acknowledge FIVE DAYS from date of issue x NOT BEFORE. Defend whole claim.

Then you EMAIL YIUR PDF DEFENCE. Never ever ever any other method. Ever.

MSE forum
Newbies thread
Post two

Read it. All of it. Twice. Then find the template defence links. Read the defence and UNDERSTAND IT. Your job is a BRIEF BACKGROUND in para two and three, with no sub para EVER, and we mean BRIEF. Not war and peace.

Any ARGUMENT you fail to raise now CANNOT be raised later. No such thing as a "skeleton" defence, you get one shot and one shot only

[Funlovingcrimina...]

Could have been lost in the post

Obviously you challenge the two year delay in bringing a claim, and thr interest they've added, and no doubt the made up debt recovery costs never incurred and in any case must be accounted for as part of the parking charge initial amount, so sayeth the appeals court and Supreme Court.

You are NEVER EVER EVER writing ANYTHING using a paper form. Don't do it

Mcol
Sign up
Acknowledge FIVE DAYS from date of issue x NOT BEFORE. Defend whole claim.

Then you EMAIL YIUR PDF DEFENCE. Never ever ever any other method. Ever.

MSE forum
Newbies thread
Post two

Read it. All of it. Twice. Then find the template defence links. Read the defence and UNDERSTAND IT. Your job is a BRIEF BACKGROUND in para two and three, with no sub para EVER, and we mean BRIEF. Not war and peace.

Any ARGUMENT you fail to raise now CANNOT be raised later. No such thing as a "skeleton" defence, you get one shot and one shot only

Much appreciated. Will read the suggested post.

Apols - didn't clarify very well - all paperwork will be completed digitally, no way will we be handwriting on the paper form! The question was really around the size of the box, in terms of what level of detail is required at this stage. But would appear that my question on that will be answered on the MSE forum.

Thanks.

[ostell]

As said you use your word processor to complete the defence then save it as a PDF then send it to the court, not forgetting to sign it.

[nosferatu1001]

Yep, as ever there is an unwritten "see attached.." when it comes to designing a paper form.

[Sheffield Dave]

Post up here the claim form, with personal details (and password) redacted.

[Funlovingcrimina...]

Post up here the claim form, with personal details (and password) redacted.

Hi Dave, copy below:

[Sheffield Dave]

You might want to include something like the following paragraphs as part of your defence. The bits in []'s are commentary, not to be included!


It is denied that a contract was entered into or breached.

It is denied that an offer was made by the C: neither by signs nor any other means: the signs contained nothing which could constitute an offer.

[ the signs have T&C like "no stopping, £100" etc, but don't actually offer anything as a consideration in return for agreeing to some T&C]

Even if there were an offer, any such wording would not have been readable from a moving car.

In any case, the C has not specified, even in general terms, the nature of the alleged offer: not in the signs, correspondence, nor on the claim form. This makes it hard for the D to produce a suitable defence, and on this basis alone the claim should be struck out.

[ This is important - we have literally no idea what was allegedly offered. The right to use the private road? The right to park? The right to use the airport? 10% off at duty-free? Your guess is as good as mine ]

Even if there were an offer, it is denied that such an offer was accepted by conduct: the signs are on a dual carriageway, and are only visible after the private part of that road has been entered; it is thus impossible to avoid accepting the alleged contract by not entering or turning off etc.

[ They might argue that the driver could have done a 360 at the roundabout and left the airport to indicate non-acceptance, but that doesn't explain all the 'no stopping' signs before the roundabout - they clearly hold that the driver accepted the contract just by driving towards the roundabout rather than teleporting away]

[ostell]

And Excel v Wilkinson for the alleged contractual costs.

Where are the alleged contractual costs displayed

[Funlovingcrimina...]

So, case went to court a couple of weeks ago........

My mrs (who the claim was against) didn't want to attend, so relied upon the witness statement.

Letter just though, claim dismissed!

Thanks to all those who supplied guidance and advice on here, literally wouldn't have known where to start without it!

By the way, if anyone wants to see the witness statement we submitted, then I'm more than happy to share. It's probably not the greatest, and I dare say there's bits that others would do differently. Alas, it's done the job!

Attached thumbnail(s)

 

[Redx]

Risky , but a good result ! Shame that we don't know what won it !!

[Funlovingcrimina...]

Risky , but a good result ! Shame that we don't know what won it !!

Yeah, my mrs just didn't feel confident - one or two big things going on life right now, so just accepted worst case scenario was a few quid to fork out.

But worked this time!

[Dave65]

Could you post up your witness statement, it no doubt would help others in a similar position?

[Funlovingcrimina...]

Could you post up your witness statement, it no doubt would help others in a similar position?

Not a problem. Please feel free to critique it - no doubt it can probably be improved, but of course I have zero legal expertise, so this has been written based on my own interpretation.

Claim Number: XXXXXXXX In the County Court of St Helens
Claim Number: XXXXXXXX between: Vehicle Control Services Ltd (Claimant) vs XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (Defendant)
Witness Statement of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Background
1.1 I am XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX St Helens, and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge. I represent myself as a litigantin-person, with no formal legal training. Everything in the following statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
1.2 In my statement I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to reference numbers where appropriate.
1.3 Firstly, it should be noted that the claimant has appended to their witness statement photographs of signage that no longer existed as of the date of the incident in question (that date being XXXXXXXXXXXX 2019). The photographs of the location in question (Liverpool John Lennon Airport) are dated as December 2016 and January 2017.
1.4 I have appended the actual signage, photographed by my partner on XXXXXXXXXXXXX 2022, and will refer to these photographs throughout. The signage in place as at XXXXXXXXXXXX 2022 is the signage that was in place on XXXXXXXXXXXXX 2019.
1.5 This is confirmed by the screenshots taken from Google Maps at three notable points in time. These screenshots are appended to this statement. All three screenshots are from the same location – that being the junction of Speke Hall Avenue with Dunlop Road.
1.6 Exhibit A is from July 2016. The signs in question are circled in red. These are the first ‘No stopping’ signs a driver will see as they approach the Airport. Exhibit B is from May 2017. The signs circled in red are in the same location as in Exhibit A, but the design on the signs has changed with the ‘£100 charge if you stop’ now in a slightly larger font than previously. Exhibit C is from July 2018 – here, the signs have been relocated. Circled in red, they have been moved south of the junction by 19.3 metres (63 feet) as exhibit F details. The motive for locating the signs a further 19.3 metres away from the junction, and thus making it far more difficult for approaching drivers to read, is unclear.
1.7 It is at this point I would question why the claimant has chosen to append photographs in their witness statement of the signs from December 2016 and January 2017 – prior to the relocation of the signs, and over two years prior to the case in question. Exhibits D and E are the views from overhead, which further demonstrate the relocation. The red circles showing the current location of the signs, with the orange circles showing the location in the claimants witness statement.
1.8 The approach to the site is from Speke Hall Avenue, a dual carriageway with double yellow lines, and a speed limit of 40 mph. The inside lane is a bus lane, although this closed in 2019 with all motorists since permitted to use both lanes. This is a busy road given it is the main route into the airport site for all vehicles. Given the nature of the road, it is not possible to stop on the approach to the site should one want to attempt to gain a better view of the signs.
1.9 The airport site begins once Speke Hall Avenue meets the junction with Dunlop Road. This is marked with a blue, green and white ‘Welcome’ sign shown in Exhibit I. Once you have driven past the junction with Dunlop Road in the direction of the airport site, there is no way of avoiding entering the airport site.
1.10 From the point of reaching the junction, the ‘No stopping’ signs are not visible or readable. The distance between the start of the junction and the first ‘No stopping’ signs is 56.54 metres (186 feet) as per Exhibit G. For reference, the standards of vision for driving requires a motorist to read a number plate from 20 metres. The claimant’s witness statement (paragraph 21) suggests the average approach speed is 30 mph, and that the text size on the signage is relative to the average approach speed. Given the speed limit is 40 mph, I would suggest the text size is therefore inadequate, and I would question the legitimacy of claiming the average approach speed is as low as 30 mph on a 40 mph stretch of straight dual carriageway.
1.11 Once you have passed the start of the junction, you can not avoid entering the airport site. Therefore in order to safely avoid entering the airport site, on the 40 mph Speke Hall Avenue, you would need make the decision a significant distance prior to the junction to allow enough opportunity to perform the Mirrors, Signal and Manoeuvre technique. Paragraph 182 of the Highway Code states that “Use your mirrors and give a left-turn signal well before you turn left”.
1.12 At the time of the incident in question (namely XXXXXXXXXXX 2019) the inside lane was still operational as a bus lane. This would mean a car driver would approach the site in the outside lane. It is only at the point 30 metres from the junction where a car driver is permitted to move to the inside lane, should they wish to turn left into Dunlop Road. Exhibit H shows the 30 metres between the end of the bus lane, and the junction.
1.13 Should the inside lane be particularly busy, it may in fact prove impossible for a car driver to safely manoeuvre into a position to allow a left turn into Dunlop Road. If this is the case, the car driver would have no option but to enter the airport site.
1.14 It would be reasonable to suggest that to safely turn left into Dunlop Road, irrespective of which lane they are in, a driver would need to commence the Mirrors, Signal and Manoeuvre technique at least 30 metres prior to the junction. To safely perform this manoeuvre in order to avoid entering the airport site, you would need to begin the Mirrors, Signal and Manoeuvre technique with the ‘No stopping’ signs still be 86 metres away. It is completely unreasonable to expect a motorist to read the signs in question from greater than 86 metres away to allow opportunity to safely avoid entering the site.
1.15 I approached the airport site on Speke Hall Avenue in the outside lane, given the aforementioned bus lane. Exhibit J is the view from the outside lane as at XXXXXXXXXX 2022. This was the same view I had on XXXXXXXXXX 2019. The sign to the right of the outside lane (circled red) is hugely obscured by a tree.
1.16 Exhibit K clearly shows that it is impossible to read what this sign says, even when you get extremely close to the sign itself. It would appear this is a deliberate attempt to make it very difficult for drivers to firstly notice, and then secondly actually read the signs. I refer back to paragraph 1.6 where I have struggled to understand what motive Vehicle Control Services Ltd (hereby known as VCS) and/or Liverpool John Lennon Airport had to move the signs further away from the site entrance by 19.3 metres. The IPC mandatory Code says that text on signage “should be of such a size and in a font that can be easily read by a motorist having regard to the likely position of the motorist in relation to the sign”. It also states that “they should be clearly seen upon entering the site” and that the signs are a vital element of forming a contract with drivers. At Liverpool Airport, it is impossible to claim the signs can clearly been seen upon entering the site.
1.17 There are also a number of warning signs located on the site, as referenced in paragraph 20 of the claimant’s witness statement. These are impossible for a driver to see, given they are located on fencing at either of the dual carriageway beyond the entrance to the site, and are much smaller than the main signs. For a driver to read these signs would require them to turn their neck to a 90 degree angle and slow down considerably. This would be extremely dangerous, involving taking their eyes off the road in front, and braking sharply from a possible 40 mph. Exhibit L shows one of these signs from the pavement, where it is very difficult to read what it says. Should you be driving a car on the dual carriageway, these signs can not be read.
1.18 Having now driven on to the site, there was some confusion amongst the three occupants in the vehicle as to where I would be able to drop off the two passengers. All three people in the car were unfamiliar with the airport, and the road layout.
1.19 Upon continuing down Speke Hall Avenue, the speed limit changes from 40 mph to 30 mph as you approach a roundabout. At the roundabout, the main terminal building is to the left, with parking options to the right. With being unsure as to which direction to travel for the appropriate drop off, and with a reasonable volume of traffic, I opted to safely remain in the outside lane and to turn right at the roundabout.
1.20 The right turn then takes you away from the main terminal building, which is then a no through road. Having driven down this road for a short while, and now heading away from the terminal, I elected to turn the vehicle around in a side road, and head back in the direction of the terminal to drop the two passengers off.
1.21 Having reversed into the side road to turn around, one of the passengers suggested they leave the vehicle at this point and simply walk to the terminal from there. Both passengers quickly agreed this would be the best option, and opened two of the cars doors to allow them to exit the car.
1.22 I will refer to the still images taken from the CCTV footage of this occurrence which are appended to the claimant’s witness statement, in order to confirm the speed at which this took place. At 10:23:14 I reversed into the side road, at 10:23:21 the front nearside passenger door can be seen open and passengers have exited the vehicle. The passengers then opened the boot of the car to retrieve their luggage. By 10:24:06 I have driven off and am back on the road and onto the roundabout to drive away from the airport site. I then drove away from the airport and back to my home address.
1.23. A number of days later, I received a Parking Charge Notice through the post for £100. The Contravention Reason is cited as “46) Stopping in a zone where stopping in prohibited”. On XXXXXXXXXX 2019 I submitted a letter stating I rejected the charge (this letter can be seen appended to the claimant’s witness statement), primarily on the basis that no contract has come into existence, since the ‘No stopping’ signs at the airport are forbidding, and there has been no offer, acceptance or consideration. I also included within my appeal the point that the airport land is covered by Liverpool Council bye-laws which regulate parking and other matters concerning vehicles. Hence any claim in respect of such matters would need to be brought by Liverpool Council as a breach of bye-laws, and not by VCS.
1.24 On XXXXXXXXX 2019, the rejection I submitted was rejected by VCS. In the letter from VCS there are a number of inaccuracies. Firstly, the letter claims there are more than 70 high profile signs advising drivers not to stop, and warning that if a driver does stop, a charge of £100 is payable. As noted in paragraphs 1.5-1.7 earlier in this statement, the signage is most definitely not ‘high profile’.
1.25 Secondly the letter claimed bye-laws are not currently in use at the airport, citing that the last set of bye-laws published related to the old airport site, and were regarded as obsolete by the airport company. A Freedom of Information Request was submitted to Liverpool City Council on 8th March 2018 (reference 578598). The response from the Council is quoted as follows: “Liverpool City Council would advise that the attached airport byelaws were confirmed by the Secretary of State on 17th June 1982 and have not been revoked or replaced to the Council’s knowledge. Whether they apply to all or part of the current airport site would be a matter of legal interpretation for the courts and no records are held in this regard.”
1.26 Whilst this Freedom of Information Request was around a year before the case in question, we can deduce from the rejection letter from VCS stating that the last set of bye-laws related to the old airport, and that the Airport Company now regarded these as obsolete, that there had been no further update in relation to the statement (quoted in paragraph 1.25) from Liverpool City Council between 8th March 2018 and XXXXXXXXXXXX 2019. Had there have been an update (notably the 1982 byelaws either revoked or replaced), one can safely assume this update would be referenced in the rejection letter from VCS. There was nothing referenced.
1.27 It is not for a private company to deem byelaws as obsolete. To state otherwise in the rejection letter from VCS is incomprehensible. Therefore there is absolutely no clarity provided that suggests VCS has the right to issue Parking Charge Notices for the roads on the airport site.
1.28 This is further supported by the Parking Terms and Conditions on Liverpool Airport’s own website. These can be found at the following address:
https://www.liverpoolairport.com/parking/te...tions-car-parks
Exhibit M shows a screenshot from the address above. Term 1.5 states that “In addition to these Terms, our parking enforcement operator, VCS Control Services Limited, also have terms and conditions, which apply once you have entered a car park at the Airport. They relate to our requirements for the parking of vehicles in our car parks, and how such requirements are enforced if not met. Their terms and conditions are located at the entrance of our car parks, and within each car park itself. If you are not prepared to comply with their terms and conditions then please do not enter the car park.”.
1.29 It is absolutely clear from the paragraph above that VCS only have authority to enforce parking terms and conditions once a vehicle enters a car park at the airport. For clarity, I will confirm that at no point on XXXXXXXXXX 2019 did I enter a car park in my car. Equally there is no suggestion from the claimant that I entered into a car park, thus rendering their claim for a Parking Charge Notice to be paid, as entirely improper based on the Parking Terms and Conditions published by the Airport.
1.30 The claimant has claimed that the Parking Charge Notice is for a Breach of Contract. Quite simply put, no contract ever existed. No offer was made by the Claimant. The Claimant’s witness statement states in paragraph 18 that “The Terms and Conditions printed on the signage displayed on site specifically state, amongst other things, the following: ‘No Stopping’ as it is private land, otherwise a Parking Charge of £100 will be issued.
1.31 The above statement is false. The signage does not at any point mention a Parking Charge will be issued should a vehicle stop in the ‘No stopping zone’, as is claimed in the quoted section from the claimant’s witness statement. Nowhere on any of the signs does the word ‘Parking’ get used. The appended photographs of the signs in the Claimant’s witness statement confirm that none of the signage mentions a ‘Parking’ Charge.
1.32 Considering this spurious claim is for payment for a Parking Charge Notice, for the alleged contract offer to fail to mention a Parking Charge would be issued, is utterly baffling. The signage contains nothing that constitutes an offer. The notion of ‘No stopping’ is prohibitive, and is not an offer – there is very clearly nothing offered in consideration. On this basis alone, the claim should be struck out.
1.33 Paragraph 11 of the claimant’s witness statement claims that “the signs specifically detail the Terms and Conditions of parking”. They do not. There is no offer to park, and there is no mention of parking in the terms and conditions. This is a falsification of what is actually shown on the signs.
1.34 This is not withstanding the fact that the signage itself, as discussed in paragraphs 10-17 can not be read until you have entered the site, indeed the vast majority of the signs can not be read at all whilst driving. Paragraph 10 of the Claimant’s witness statement claims that “upon entering the Land, the driver accepted the contract and agreed to be bound by those terms advertised”. That motorists have yet to have an opportunity to read the alleged offer before they enter the site, deems it utterly impossible to accept an offer for which you have not yet had sight of at the point at which you enter the site.
1.35 The claimant, via 3rd party debt collection agencies have since 2019 been regularly sending threatening letters. It is clear these letters are deliberately designed to bully defendants into making payment. Exhibits N and O are examples of this.
Prohibition
2.1 It is my position that the Claimant has no standing, or cause of action, to litigate in this matter. I base this on the case PCM v Bull, Claim No. B4GF26K6 (exhibit R – paragraph 18), where the Defendant was issued parking tickets for parking on private roads with signage stating “no parking at any time”.
District Judge Glen in his judgment stated that: “If the notice had said no more than if you park on this roadway you agree to pay a charge then it would have been implicit that PCM was saying we will allow you to park on this roadway if you pay £100 and I would agree with Mr Samuels’ first analysis that essentially the £100 was a part of the core consideration for the licence and was not a penalty for breach. The difficulty is that this notice does not say that at all. This notice is an absolute prohibition against parking at any time, for any period, on the roadway. It is impossible to construct out of this in any way, either actually or contingently or conditionally, any permission for anyone to park on the roadway. All this is essentially saying is you must not trespass on the roadway. If you do we are giving ourselves, and we are dressing it up in the form of a contract, the right to charge you a sum of money which really would be damages for trespass, assuming of course that the claimant had any interest in the land in order to proceed in trespass.”.
2.2 I question the existence of the alleged contract which the Claimant claims to have been breached by “stopping in a zone where stopping is prohibited”. The signage is wholly prohibitive and makes no offer of consideration. In the absence of consideration, no contract exists.
2.3 In case Ransomes vs Anderson, Claim No. 3YS16797, the Defendant went to the industrial estate and after not being able to get into their designated parking area, parked on the road, on a double yellow line, for which he was issued a parking ticket. In his judgment the district judge rejected the contract claim on the basis that the notice was too vague and uncertain to generate contractual liability. The sign, in question, started with: “Warning: Private property. No Trespassing. No Parking. No Stopping. No Waiting. You have entered this private property. You are now subject to the terms and conditions of the landowner listed below”. District Judge accepted in principle that Mr Anderson committed a trespass and that trespass must have caused some loss to the claimant, in terms of expenses incurred, but made no award of damages in relation to it and dismissed the claim
Locus Standi
3.1 The Service Agreement between VCS and Liverpool Airport dated 08/07/2013 clearly states “for a fixed period of 24 months, therefore this contract expired in July 2015. It is contended that no legal contract existed between VCS and Liverpool Airport, at the time of the alleged breach of contract.
3.2 Definition of "Relevant contract” from PoFA 2 [1] means a contract (including a contract arising only when the vehicle was parked on the relevant land) between the driver and a person who is— (a)the owner or occupier of the land; or (b) authorised, under or by virtue of arrangements made by the owner or occupier of the land, to enter into a contract with the driver requiring the payment of parking charges in respect of the parking of the vehicle on the land. I have included Schedule 4 of PoFA in exhibit S.
3.3 According to https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/44 a contract to be valid requires a director from each company to sign and then two independent witnesses must confirm those signatures.
3.4 The claimant’s witness statement includes a document entitled ‘Contract Witness Statement’, dated 19/10/2015. The fact that no witness signatures are present means the deed has not been validly executed. Therefore, there can be no contract established between VCS and the motorist. Furthermore, even if ‘no stopping’ could form a contract (which as has already been established, it can not), it is immaterial. There is no valid contract which entitles VCS to operate Parking Management, Control and Enforcement at the Liverpool airport site.
The land owners of the Liverpool airport site are Peel Group/Ancala, not Liverpool airport.
More recently, Ancala Partners LLP, the independent infrastructure Investment Manager completed the acquisition of a 45% interest in the Airport in September 2019, with Peel and Liverpool City Council retaining 45% and 10% interests respectively.
3.5 VCS is clearly a company that signs innumerable contracts, and must be aware that no contract exists at the Liverpool Airport. Two points arise from that;
3.6 The first is that by issuing vast numbers of PCNs at Liverpool Airport with knowingly not having a valid contract, is bordering on fraudulent behaviour.
3.7 The second, is that VCS in order to gain access to DVLA data, VCS have averred that they have complied in their Code of Pratice that they have complied with all the legal necessities, which appears patently untrue.
3.8 As Lord Neuberger said in the famous Parking Eye v Beavis at the Supreme Court [2015] UKSC 67- "And, while the Code of Practice is not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA. In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced".
The Noble Lord is correct and should call into question the right of VCS to obtain information from the DVLA.

Illegal contract
4.1 After extensive checking, I found out that there is in fact no planning permission granted for signs we have discussed, therefore making them illegal as lack of planning permission is a criminal offence under the Road Traffic Acts 1962 and 1991. No contract can be performed where criminality is concerned.
4.2 A planning application for the relevant signage (ref: 15A/0657) was made on 11/03/2015 which expired on 24/08/2015, however without permission being granted this application was later withdrawn by the applicant on 16/06/2021.
Abuse of process
5.1 The Claimant seeks recovery of the original £100 parking charge plus an additional £60 described as “Debt Recovery Charge”. No further justification or breakdown has been provided as required under Civil Procedure Rule 16.4.
5.2 PoFA Schedule 4, paragraph 4(5) states that “The maximum sum which may be recovered from the keeper is the amount specified in the notice to keeper” - which in this case is £100.
5.3 Unless the Claimant can clearly demonstrate how these alleged additional costs have been incurred, this would appear to be an attempt at double recovery.
5.4 Previous parking charge cases have found that the parking charge itself is at a level to include the costs of recovery ie: Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis (2015) UKSC 67 - which is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85) was held to already incorporate the costs of an automated private parking business model, and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession can not plead any part of their case in damages.
5.5 It is indisputable that an alleged ‘parking charge’ penalty is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, that the £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100, depending on the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters.
5.6 Since 2019, many County Courts have considered claims in excess of £100 to be an abuse of process leading to them being struck out ab initio. An example, in the Caernarfon Court in VCS v Davies, case No. FTQZ4W28 on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated ''Upon it being recorded that District Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court v Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued, he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''
5.7 In claim numbers F0DP806M and F0DP201T, Britannia v Crosby the courts went further in a landmark judgement in November 2019, which followed several parking charge claims being struck out in the area overseen by His Honour Judge Iain Hamilton-Douglas Hughes GC, the Designated Civil Judge for Dorset, Hampshire, Isle of Wight & Wiltshire. District Judge Taylor echoed earlier General Judgment or Orders of District Judge Grand, stating ''It is ordered that the claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''
5.8 The addition of costs not previously specified on signage are also in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 2, specifically paras 6, 10 and 14.
5.9 VCS are attempting double, indeed triple recovery. As well as £50 legal costs they have invented an extra sum of £60. Furthermore, in a letter to me dated XXXXXXXXXXX 2022, they state they will ask the court for £220 extra costs although they know full well that legal costs are capped at £50. Said letter is shown in Exhibit P.
5.10 It is the Defendant’s position that the Claimant in this case has knowingly submitted inflated costs and thus the entire claim should be similarly struck out in accordance with Civil Procedure Rule 3.3(4)
5.11 In VCS’s Witness Statement paragraph 39, Ambreen Arshad is being somewhat disingenuous when she says she ‘may’ be unable to attend the hearing. I have researched scores of VCS court cases and I can not find even one where Ms Arshad has ever appeared in court. The same goes for Mr Mohammed Wali, the other paralegal employed by VCS to write witness statements. This is particularly remarkable as hearings have been done by telephone or online during the COVID pandemic, with no travelling involved. It seems that under no circumstances are VCS willing to have their witness statement authors questioned in court.
5.12 Ms Ashad also goes on to mention breaches to Terms and Conditions for parking services and relevant parking charges (paragraph 17) which states the defendant was “stopped on the access road”, therefore breached the Terms and Condition of the site and liable for the parking charge. An access road isn’t a car park, furthermore ‘stopping’ is not ‘parking’. On the same access road where the incident in question occurred, there is a zebra crossing (see Exhibit Q). To suggest a driver may not stop without breaching Terms and Conditions, would indicate that you can not stop at said zebra crossing without paying £100. Nowhere in the Highway Code does it mention a fee must be paid for stopping at a zebra crossing to allow pedestrians to cross.
5.13 In her paragraph 22 Ms Arshad makes great play of the fact that the IPC considers the Claimant's signage to be sufficient. The IPC is a trade body, hopelessly biased in favour of its members. In fact the IPC was set up as a rival to the British Parking Association because in the opinion of companies like VCS, the British Parking Association was far too fair to motorists and cancelled far too many tickets. It is neither here nor there what the IPC considers as reasonable and lawful. What counts is what the law in England and Wales considers as reasonable and lawful.
5.14 on 07/02/2022 a new Code of Practice was published by Sir Greg Knight MP, designed to prevent these “rogue” traders from ripping people off with inflated charges and extra charges, which have been deemed unfair. (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice/private-parking-code-of-practice)
5.15 Section 5.3 of the new Code of Practice states the following:
“The provisions of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 relate specifically to the parking of vehicles on relevant land and the recovery of parking charges – they arose from the need to respect landowners’ interests given the introduction of the prohibition on wheelclamping, and so largely envisage circumstances where a wheel-clamp may otherwise have been applied i.e. to a stationary, generally unoccupied, vehicle. However, this Code also applies to instances where the prohibition on stopping arises from a clear security concern e.g. within airports. Parking operators must only pursue parking charges in instances that could be interpreted as stopping if they have explicit consent to do so on evidenced security or safety grounds from their conformity assessment body, following audit of the adequacy of the signs and surface markings in place to inform drivers of the restrictions in place”
5.16 Section 14.1 - Relationship with Landowner:
“g) responsibility for obtaining relevant consents e.g. planning or advertising consents relating to signs”. There is no planning permission in place for the relevant signage at Liverpool airport.
5.17 The Minister Neil O’Brien, also goes on to state “And there will be no wriggle-room for rogue companies who continue to flout the rules. If they fail to follow this Code, they will effectively be banned from issuing parking charges indefinitely”.
5.18 The publication of this Code therefore marks the start of an adjustment period in which parking companies will be expected to follow as many of these new rules as possible. The Code will then come into full force before 2024, when the single appeals service is expected to be in operation. This indicates that the new Code of Practice should be adhered to now, where possible, but clearly VCS are choosing to ignore these new rules, and continuing to go about their business as normal, regardless of the law.
Conclusion:
6.1 I invite the Court to dismiss this Claim in its entirety, and to award my costs of preparation for this hearing, such as are allowable pursuant to CPR 27.14 (see Section 04 – Schedule of Costs)
6.2 I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.